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GEZGİN IP VE GÜVENLİK 
ÖZET 
Yirminci yüzyılın ilk yarısından sonra, en önemli devrimlerden biri bilgisayar ağları 
olmuştur. Bunların modern yaşamdaki önemi gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Bilgisayar 
ağlarının yaygın kullanımının güdüsü, insanların genel ve ortak çıkarları için 
haberleşme gereksiniminden kaynaklanmaktadır. Dünyadaki en büyük ağlardan biri 
olan Internet, bu gereksinimleri karşılamak amacıyla tasarlanmıştır. 
Internet kullanıcılarının yeni gereksinimlerinden biri olan gezginlik, teknolojinin 
hızlı ilerlemesi sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır. Gezginlik, bir düğümün bağıntı noktasını 
değiştirirken, mevcut haberleşmelerini sürdürebilme yeteneği olarak 
tanımlanmaktadır. Bilgisayar tabanlı haberleşme sistemlerinde, gezginliği sağlamak 
için OSI referans modelinin veya DoD referans modelinin tüm katmanları gezginliği 
desteklemesi gerekir. Ancak, bu tezde sadece dünya çapında gezginliği sağlamada en 
önemli katmanlardan biri olan ağ katmanı gezginliği üzerinde çalışılmıştır. 
Internet kullanıcılarının diğer bir yeni ihtiyacı da güvenliktir. Bilgisayar haberleşme 
ağlarının güvenliğini sağlama ile ilgili bir çok yöntem vardır, fakat en yaygın olanı 
IPSec’tir. IPSec, sistemin ihitiyacı olan protokolü seçmeyi sağlayan, servisler için 
kullanılmak istenen algoritmayı belirleyen ve istenilen servis için gereksinim 
duyulan kriptografik anahtarları arzeden bir çözümdür. 
Farklı cihazlar üzerinde çalıştırılan Gezgin IP ve IPSec, ağlar arasında sınırlı 
gezginlik gibi problemlere sebep olmaktadır. Bunların sebebi, protokollerin 
doğasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bundan dolayı, IPSec kullanan sistemlerde 
gezginliğin görünmezliğinin sağlanma ihtiyacı vardır. 
Bu tezde, Internet ve Intranette gezginliğin ve güvenliğin biribirine görünmez olduğu 
yeni bir mimari önerilmiştir. Bu mimaride, standart protokollerin özelliklerinden ve 
yeni mimari ile gelen özelliklerden yararlanılmıştır. İlk önce, önerilen yeni mimari 
sunulmuş ve mimarinin özellikleri tanımlanmıştır. Sonra, mimari ile ilgili muhtemel 
senaryolardan söz edilmiştir. Son olarak, önerilen mimari, senaryolar doğrultusunda 
paket boyu, yük ve güvenlik yönünden analiz edilmiştir.  
Gezgin IPv4’ün IPSec tabanlı Sanal Özel Ağ Geçidinin olduğu bir sistemde 
gezmesine yönelik önerilen mimarinin sunumu ve analizine ek olarak, Gezgin 
IPv6’nin IPSec tabanlı Sanal Özel Ağ Geçidinin olduğu bir sistemde gezmesine 
yönelik oluşturulabilecek bir mimarinin gereksinimleri belirlenmiştir. Bunun amacı 
Gezgin IPv6 ile IPSec’in bir sistemde problemsiz bir arada var olmalarını sağlayacak 
çalışmaların başlangıcını oluşturmaktır. 
Internet ve Intranette gezginliği ve güvenliği sağlamaya yönelik oluşturulacak efektif 
bir mekanizma için daha yapılacak çok iş vardır. Örneğin, IPSec ve Gezgin IPv4 
birbirleri ile uyumlu değildir. Ancak gezginlik ve güvenlik bu protokollerin ikisine 
de ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Dolayısıyla, IPSec ve Gezgin IPv4’ün aynı sistemde 
bulunmalarına yönelik yeni çözümlere ihtiyaç vardır. Ayrıca, önerilen yeni 
 xiii 
mimarinin gerçeklenmesi gelecekte yapılması gereken işlerden biridir. Bir de yeterli 
bir ağ sezme algoritması tasarlanmalıdır. Bunlara ek olarak, yönlendirme işleminin 
optimizasyon çalışmaları sürdürülmelidir. Ayrıca, belirlenen gerekler doğrultusunda 
Gezgin IPv6’ya yönelik yeni mimariler gerçeklenebilir. Diğer taraftan, gezginliği ve 
güvenliği sağlamaya yönelik yeni çözümler, Gezgin IPv6 ve IPv6 güncellenerek 
bulunabilir. 
Önerilen mimarinin daha iyi anlaşılması için bir benzetim yazılımı hazırlanmıştır. 
Benzetim yazılımın koşması, bir senaryo örneği üzerinde açıklanmıştır. 
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MOBILE IP AND SECURITY 
SUMMARY 
Computer networks have been one of the most significant revolution of twentieth 
century. They have come to play an increasingly important role in modern life. The 
motivation for the widespread use of computer networks has been the need for 
communication between people for their common and shared interests. One of the 
biggest networks, which network is the Internet, was designed to meet these 
requirements. 
Due to the rapid technological progress, the services demanded by Internet users 
introduce new requirements such as mobility that can be described as the ability of a 
node to change its point-of-attachment from one link to another while maintaining its 
all-existing communications. To ensure complete mobility for a computer 
communication system, all layers of OSI reference model or DoD reference model 
must support mobility features. However, the motivation of this thesis is the impact 
at mobility to the Network Layer of OSI reference model. 
Security is another requirement due to the new services. There are various security 
mechanisms to protect computer communication networks; however, the most 
popular one is IPSec. The IPSec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling 
the system to select required security protocols, determine the algorithms to use for 
the services, and put in place any cryptographic keys required to provide the 
requested services. 
Using Mobile IP and IPSec on different devices causes problems such as limited 
mobility between different networks. The reasons for these are related with the 
nature of the protocols. Therefore, there is a need to support seemless mobility in 
systems that use IPSec. 
In this thesis, a new architecture to establish seemless mobility and security both in 
the Intranet and in the Internet by using and by adding new features to standard 
communication protocols was presented. First, the new architecture was presented 
and its properties were described. Then, several scenarios for this architecture were 
discussed. And finally, the scenarios were analyzed with respect to message size, 
overhead and security properties. 
In addition to proposal and analysis a new architecture of Mobile IPv4 traversing 
IPSec based VPN Gateway, requirements of possible solutions for Mobile IPv6 
traversing IPSec based VPN Gateway were established. The aim of this is to start the 
work for coexistence of both Mobile IPv6 and IPSec in a system without any 
problem. 
It needs great effort to establish efficient mechanism for accommodating both 
security and mobility in the Internet and in the Intranet. For instance, IPSec and 
Mobile IPv4 are not compatible with each other. However, mobility and security 
features necessitate both of them. Therefore, new solutions for coexistence of both 
 xv 
IPSec and Mobile IPv4 in same system are needed. On the other hand, future works 
have to be carried on realizing the new architecture. A sufficiently secure network 
detection algorithm should be designed. In addition to these, researches on routing 
optimization may be carried on. Also, new architectures can also be designed to use 
with Mobile IPv6 according to requirements. On the other hand, new solutions 
should be found to ensure security and mobility worldwide with updating Mobile 
IPv6 and also IPv6. 
Simulation software that was used to simulate the proposed architecture was 
introduced. Moreover, the explanation of execution of the software in respect of one 
scenario was given. 
 
 
 
 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, the Internet has become a universal network [1] that allows full 
connectivity, and that is accessible from various networks. The network layer 
protocol of the Internet is Internet Protocol (IP), which has two main versions, IPv4 
[2] and IPv6 [3]. As the number of Internet users increase, expectations of them 
become different. The main two expectations are security and mobility. Security of a 
node is related with all communication layers [1] of a computer network, and there 
are different mechanisms to protect each of them. The second main expectation of 
Internet users are mobility which has become popular after wireless technologies 
have been deployed such as 802.11b, Bluetooth, and etc. 
To ensure complete mobility for a computer communication system all layers of OSI 
[4,5] reference model or DoD [4,5] reference model must support mobility features. 
However, the motivation of this thesis is mobility on Network Layer. “In the 
Internet, mobility is the ability of a node to change its point-of attachment from one 
link to another while maintaining its all existing communications and using the same 
IP address at its new link”[6]. Normally, a node may not move from one link to 
another if it wants to continue its ongoing communications without changing the 
network-prefix portion of its IP address. Mobile IP that is an ongoing effort under 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) towards an Internet Standard is a mobility 
solution only for the network layer. Mobile IPv4 defines extension mechanisms on 
the top of existing IPv4 to allow transparent routing of IP datagram between a 
Mobile Node and its Corresponding Node when the Mobile Node changes its point-
of attachment in the Internet. 
There are different security mechanisms to protect Internet Layer (Network Layer). 
However, the most known is the IP Security Protocol (IPSec), which protocol is used 
in this thesis to support security on the proposed architecture. IPSec is a protocol 
proposed by the IETF as a standard protocol. The IPSec provides security services at 
the IP layer by enabling a system to select required security protocols, determine the 
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algorithms to use for the services, and put in place any cryptographic keys required 
to provide the requested services. 
Using Mobile IP and IPSec on different devices causes problems such as limited 
mobility between different networks. The reasons of these are related with the nature 
of these protocols. Therefore, there is a need to support seemless mobility in systems 
that use IPSec. In this thesis, the architecture of Mobile IPv4 traversing IPSec based 
VPN Gateways that ensures seemless secure mobility is proposed, and the simulation 
software is realized according to the proposed architecture. Then, analytical analyses 
of proposed architecture are done. Moreover, design requirements of Mobile IPv6 
traversing IPSec based VPN Gateways are proposed. 
The thesis consists of six chapters and an appendix whose descriptions are given in 
following paragraphs. 
The first chapter is the introduction chapter. In this chapter, the motivation of the 
thesis is presented. After this, the basic terms related with this topic are presented. 
For instance, computer networks and Internet Protocol are some of them. 
In the second chapter, the basic properties of Mobile IPv4 and the properties of 
Mobile IPv6 are presented. 
In chapter three, various security threats, protocols, and solutions related with Mobile 
IP are described. Generally, this section is constructed as follows. At the beginning, 
basics of cryptography are overviewed. Then, the security architecture for the 
Internet Protocol (IPSec) is described. Afterwards, other security protocols are 
shortly presented. Next, some key distribution mechanisms are described. Also, 
security threats and security solutions are presented. 
In the chapter four, it is proposed a new architecture of Mobile IPv4 traversing IPSec 
based VPN Gateway. At the beginning of the section, related works are summarized. 
Analytical analysis of the proposed architecture is done after description of this 
architecture.  
The chapter five establishes requirements of possible solution of Mobile IPv6 
traversing IPSec based VPN Gateway.  
Last chapter, chapter six, is devoted to conclusions and discussion. The conclusions 
are derived according to analyses and requirements. 
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In Appendix A, simulation software that was used to simulate the proposed 
architecture was introduced. Moreover, the explanation of execution of the software 
in respect of one scenario was given. 
1.1 Computer Networks  
Computers communicate over a network by transmitting and receiving digital 
information. This information consists of binary digits, called bits, which take on the 
values zero or one. Bits are grouped into 8-bit chunks, called bytes, which can further 
be grouped into bundles called frames or packets. 
Before two computers can exchange packets, they must be connected by some form 
of physical medium, such as copper wire, optical fiber, or electromagnetic radiation 
(radio waves). Occasionally, the two computers will be connected by the same 
uninterrupted piece of physical wire or wireless link, in which case they can send 
packets directly. In most cases, however, the packets sent by a computer will have to 
traverse one or more intermediate switching devices in order to reach their final 
destination [5,6,7]. 
The merging of computers and communications has had a profound influence on the 
way computer systems are organized. The concept of the “computer center” as a 
room with a large computer to which users bring their work for processing is now 
totally obsolete. The old model of a single computer serving all of the organization’s 
computational needs has been replaced by one in which a large number of separate 
but interconnected computers do the job. These systems are called computer 
networks [5]. 
There are two main reference models for computer networking which are The Open 
System Interconnection (OSI) reference model for computer networking as defined 
by the International Organization of Standardization (ISO). The other reference 
model is the DoD (U.S. Department of Defense) reference model [4,5]. 
The OSI model has seven layers. Each of seven layers performs a specific set of 
functions and in turn provides a distinct set of services to the layer above it. The rules 
and procedures governing the operation of the various layers are called protocols 
[5,6]. 
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Each protocol in OSI model is theoretically independent of the protocols in the layers 
above and below it. This allows for new technologies to be incorporated into a 
protocol layer without affecting the other layers – so long as the service provided it is 
replacing. While this is the theory, efficiency and other considerations tend to cause 
some degree of independency between the layers. 
Session (Layer 5)
Network (Layer 3)
Transport (Layer 4)
Data Link (Layer 2)
Physical (Layer 1)
Presentation (Layer 6)
Application (Layer 7)
 
Figure 1.1. The OSI reference model 
The OSI model is shown in Figure 1.1 [4,5,6]. Below it is discussed each layer of the 
model in turn, starting at the bottom layer. 
 The physical layer moves raw bits across a communications facility, or 
medium. A physical-layer protocol defines the electrical and the mechanical 
characteristics of the medium, the bit rate, the voltage, etc. 
 The data link layer uses the raw bit- transmission facility provide by the 
physical layer to move frames from one computer to a neighboring computer 
on the same link. A frame consists of a small data link-layer header plus a 
network-layer packet. A data-link layer protocol defines methods for ensuring 
the reliability of each frame and also arbitrates access to those media types 
which are shared by many computers. 
 The network layer uses the frame-transmission facility provided by the data 
link layer to move packets from their original source to their ultimate 
destination, traversing one or more intermediate links if necessary. A packet 
consists of a small network-layer header plus data from the higher layer. A 
network-layer protocol defines how network devices discover each other and 
how packets are routed to their final destination. 
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 The transport layer is responsible for making the end-to-end packet-
transmission facility provided by the network layer. The data, which flows 
across this reliable, end-to-end transmission facility, is generally called 
stream. Each individual transmission at the transport layer, called a segment, 
consists of a small transport-layer header plus data from a higher-layer 
protocol. Thus, a segment forms the payload portion of a network-layer 
packet. A transport-layer protocol defines the methods for detecting errors in 
the transmission of segments and for correcting them when they occur. 
 The session layer takes the reliable stream provided by the transport layer and 
delivers rich, application-oriented services to the higher layers. Some session-
layer protocols, for example, provide periodic checkpoints, to which 
communications can be resumed in the event of a catastrophic network 
failure. This is useful when sending very large files over unreliable networks, 
where restarting the entire transmission from the beginning would be 
extremely wasteful of network resources. 
 The presentation layer defines the syntax and semantics of the information 
being exchanged by an application. This means that a presentation-layer 
protocol defines how the integers, text messages, and other data of an 
application are to be encoded and transmitted over the network. This allows 
all computers of varying hardware and operating systems to exchange 
information, regardless of their own particular method of storing such data. 
 The application layer provides the transfer of information that is specific to 
the computer program being run by a user. Some application-layer protocols 
define how electronic mail is to be exchanged. Some application layer 
protocols define how files are to be transferred from one computer to another, 
and some define World Wide Web pages are to be fetched form a web server 
by a web client. 
The Internet model of communications, as embodied in the TCP/IP suite of 
protocols, resembles but varies slightly from the OSI model. For instance, the 
Internet model generally groups the highest three layers of the OSI model together 
and considers them to be one layer, the application layer. The TCP/IP reference 
model is shown in Figure 1.2 [4,5,6]. 
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Application Layer
Internet Layer
Transport Layer
Data Link and Physical Layer
 
Figure 1.2. Internet (TCP/IP) reference model 
The Internet model consists of four layers as it is shown in Figure 1.2. These layers 
are described below: 
 The data link and physical layer is that it specifies details of how data is 
physically sent through the network, including how bits are electrically 
signaled by hardware devices that interface directly with a network medium, 
such as coaxial cable, optical fiber, or twisted-pair copper wire. Protocols run 
on this layer are Ethernet, Token Ring, X.25, Frame Relay, RS-232, v.35 and 
etc. 
 The Internet layer is second layer in this model. It packages data into IP 
datagrams, which contain source and destination address information that is 
used to forward the datagrams between hosts and across networks. Performs 
routing of IP datagrams. IP, ICMP, ARP are some of the protocols run on this 
layer. 
 The transport layer provides communication session management between 
host computers. Defines the level of service and status of the connection used 
when transporting data. TCP and UDP are protocols run on this layer. 
 The application layer defines TCP/IP application protocols and how host 
programs interface with transport layer services to use the network. HTTP, 
Telnet, FTP, SNMP, DNS, SMTP, X Windows, other application protocols 
are some of application layer protocols. 
1.2 IP (Internet Protocol) 
1.2.1 Introduction to the Internet protocol 
The Internet Protocol is designed for use in interconnected systems of packet-
switched computer communication networks. The Internet Protocol provides for 
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transmitting blocks of data called datagram from sources to destinations, where 
sources and destinations are hosts identified by fixed length addresses [2]. 
In the late 1960s, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) of the 
United States noticed that there was a rapid proliferation of computers in military 
communications. Computers, because they could be easily programmed, provided 
flexibility in achieving network functions that was not available with other types of 
communication equipment. The computers that were used in military 
communications were manufactured by different vendors and were designed to 
interoperate with computers from that vendor only. Vendors used proprietary 
protocols in their communication equipment. The military had a multivendor 
network but no communication protocol to support the heterogeneous equipment 
from different vendors. 
To solve these problems, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) mandated that the 
DARPA define a common set of protocols. The reason for having a common set of 
protocols includes the following: 
 Procurement simplification. 
 Fostering of competition among vendors. 
 Interoperability. 
 Vendor productivity and efficiency. 
In 1969, an experiment was conducted by DARPA to use a computer network to 
connect four sites that are University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), 
University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), University of Utah and SRI 
International.  
In 1972, an ARPAnet demonstration was done with 50 packet-switched nodes 
(PSNs) and 20 hosts. Like preceding 4-node experiment, this one was also a success, 
and it set the stage for large-scale deployment of PSNs and hosts on the ARPAnet. 
The ARPAnet continued to grow and went through a series of transformations. Prior 
to 1984, the ARPAnet consisted of specialized military networks connected with the 
ARPAnet. After 1984, the specialized military networks formed their own network 
that was not connected to any other network. By 1986, the ARPAnet had expanded 
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to encompass all major universities, the military network called MILNET, research 
laboratories. 
Gradually the ARPAnet itself was replaced by the Internet. The Internet is 
experiencing a rapid commercialization and is no longer the exclusive domain of 
universities and research organizations than any other source on the Internet. [4] 
IP is a network layer protocol at OSI reference model and network layer protocol at 
Internet (TCP/IP) reference model. IP, like all network-layer protocols, moves 
packets of information from the original source to the ultimate destination. This 
service is sometimes referred to as “end-to-end packet delivery”. The reliability of 
the service provided by IP is called “best-effort”, which means that IP will try very 
hard to deliver a packet to the destination, but IP makes no guarantee that the packet 
will arrive without error [5]. 
1.2.2 IPv4 (Internet Protocol version 4) 
The IPv4 is specifically limited in scope to provide the functions necessary to deliver 
a package of bits (an Internet datagram) from a source to a destination over an 
interconnected system of networks. There are no mechanisms to augment end-to-end 
data reliability, flow control, sequencing, or other services commonly found in host-
to-host protocols. The IPv4 can capitalize on the services of its supporting networks 
to provide various types and qualities of service [2]. 
The IP implements two basic functions: addressing and fragmentation. The Internet 
modules use the addresses carried in the Internet header to transmit Internet datagram 
toward their destinations. The selection of a path for transmission is called routing. 
The Internet modules use fields in the Internet header to fragment and reassemble 
Internet datagram when necessary for transmission through "small packet" networks. 
The model of operation is that an Internet module resides in each host engaged in 
Internet communication and in each gateway that interconnects networks. These 
modules share common rules for interpreting address fields and for fragmenting and 
assembling Internet datagram. In addition, these modules (especially in gateways) 
have procedures for making routing decisions and other functions. 
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The IP treats each Internet datagram as an independent entity unrelated to any other 
Internet datagram. There are no connections or logical circuits (virtual or otherwise) 
[2]. 
The IPv4 consists of only one type IP header that is described in [2]. 
The following scenario illustrates the model of operation for transmitting a datagram 
from one application program to another: 
 It is supposed that this transmission will involve one intermediate gateway. 
 The sending application program prepares its data and calls on its local 
Internet module to send that data as a datagram and passes the destination 
address and other parameters as arguments of the call. 
 The Internet module prepares a datagram header and attaches the data to it. 
The Internet module determines a local network address for this Internet 
address; in this case it is the address of a gateway. It sends this datagram and 
the local network address to the local network interface. 
 The local network interface creates a local network header, and attaches the 
datagram to it, then sends the result via the local network. 
 The datagram arrives at a gateway host wrapped in the local network header; 
the local network interface strips off this header, and turns the datagram over 
to the Internet module. The Internet module determines from the Internet 
address that the datagram is to be forwarded to another host in a second 
network. The Internet module determines a local net address for the 
destination host. It calls on the local network interface for that network to 
send the datagram. 
 This local network interface creates a local network header and attaches the 
datagram sending the result to the destination host. 
 At this destination host the datagram is stripped of the local net header by the 
local network interface and handed to the Internet module. 
 The Internet module determines that the datagram is for an application 
program in this host. It passes the data to the application program in response 
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to a system call, passing the source address and other parameters as results of 
the call [2]. 
1.2.3 IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6) 
As the Internet has grown, it became apparent to many observers that the existing 
version of IP was inadequate to meet the performance and functional requirements 
for the Internet. In response to these needs, the IETF issued a call for proposals for a 
next-generation IP (IPng) in July of 1992. A number of proposals were received, and 
by 1994 the final design for IPng emerged. A major milestone was reached with the 
publication of RFC 1752, "The Recommendation for the IP Next Generation 
Protocol," issued in January 1995. RFC 1752 outlines the requirements for IPng, 
specifies the PDU formats, and highlights the IPng approach in the areas of 
addressing, routing, and security. A number of other Internet documents define 
details of the protocol, now officially called IPv6 [6,9-23]. 
In addition, a number of new security features have been designed for use with IPv6 
but can also be used with the existing IPv4. The driving motivation for the adoption 
of a new version of IP was the limitation imposed by the 32-bit address field in IPv4. 
But other considerations as well drove the design of IPv6 [8]. 
The only header that is required is referred to simply as the IPv6 header. This is of 
fixed size with a length of 40 octets, compared to 20 octets for the mandatory portion 
of the IPv4 header. The following extension headers have been defined [3]: 
 Hop-by-hop options header: Defines special options that require hop-by-hop 
processing  
 Routing header: Provides extended routing, similar to IPv4 source routing  
 Fragment header: Contains fragmentation and reassembly information  
 Authentication header: Provides packet integrity and authentication  
 Encapsulating security payload header: Provides privacy  
 Destination options header: Contains optional information to be examined by 
the destination node. 
The IPv6 standard recommends that, when multiple extension headers are used, the 
IPv6 headers appear in the following order:  
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 IPv6 header: Mandatory, must always appears first.  
 Hop-by-hop options header.  
 Destination options header: For options to be processed by the first 
destination that appears in the IPv6 destination address field plus subsequent 
destinations listed in the routing header.  
 Routing header  
 Fragment header  
 Authentication header  
 Encapsulating security payload header  
 Destination options header: For options to be processed only by the final 
destination of the packet. 
1.2.3.1 Addressing architecture 
IPv6 increases the IP address size from 32 bits to 128 bits, to support more levels of 
addressing hierarchy, a much greater number of addressable nodes, and simpler auto-
configuration of addresses. The scalability of multicast routing is improved by 
adding a "scope" field to multicast addresses. And a new type of address called an 
"anycast address" is defined, used to send a packet to any one of a group of nodes 
[3,16,19,21-22]. 
1.2.3.2 Header format 
Some IPv4 header fields have been dropped, or they made optional. The reasons of 
these are to reduce the common-case processing cost of packet handling and to limit 
the bandwidth cost of the IPv6 header [3]. 
1.2.3.3 Support for extensions and options 
Changes in the way IP header options are encoded allows for more efficient 
forwarding, less stringent limits on the length of options, and greater flexibility for 
introducing new options in the future. [3,9-11] 
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1.2.3.4 Flow labeling capability 
A new capability is added to enable the labeling of packets belonging to particular 
traffic "flows" for which the sender requests special handling, such as non-default 
quality of service or "real-time" service [3]. 
1.2.3.5 Authentication and privacy capabilities 
Extensions to support authentication, data integrity, and (optional) data 
confidentiality are specified for IPv6 [3,24-25]. 
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2.  MOBILE INTERNET PROTOCOL 
Mobile IP is the mobility protocol for Internet Protocol. It has versions, which are 
Mobile IP version 4 and Mobile IP version 6. Mobile IP version 4 is proposed in [26] 
by IETF while Mobile IP version 6 is proposed in [27]. 
In the terminology, mobility is defined as the ability of a node to change its point-of-
attachment from one link to another while maintaining its all-existing 
communications and using the same IP address at its new link. On the other hand, 
nomadicity is defined as the ability of a node, which must terminate all existing 
communications before changing its point-of-attachment, but then can initiate new 
connections with a new address once it reaches its new location. 
This chapter is presented in six sections. The first section explains the need for 
Mobile IP. The second section introduces Mobile IP. Next section proposes 
requirements for Mobile IP. The forth section explains mobility support for IPv4. 
The fifth section explains mobility support for IPv6. And the last section shows the 
main differences between Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6. 
2.1 Need for Mobile IP 
2.1.1 The problem of changing link for a node 
Routing decisions in an IP network are made based upon the network-prefix portion 
of the IP Destination Address. This implies that all nodes with interfaces on a given 
link must have identical network-prefix portions of their IP addresses on those 
interfaces. In addition to this, IP packets directed to a specific address will be routed 
toward the routers, which advertise reachability to the network-prefix of that address. 
If a node is not located on the link where its network-prefix paints, then packets sent 
to that node cannot be delivered. Obviously, this means that such a node is incapable 
of communicating with any other node. As a corollary, a node may not move from 
one link to another if it wishes to communicate – without minimally changing the 
network-prefix portion of its IP address to reflect its new point-of-attachment to the 
network [6,26]. 
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2.1.2 Host-specific routes 
The strict source and record route (SSRR) provides a means for the source of an 
Internet datagram to supply routing information to be used by the gateways in 
forwarding the datagram to the destination, and to record the route information [2]. 
The following points make host-specific routes an unworkable solution to node 
mobility in the Internet: 
 Minimally, host-specific routes must be propagated to all nodes along the 
path between a mobile node’s home link and its foreign link. 
 Some (in the worst case all) of these routes must be updated every time the 
node moves from one link to another. 
 It is expected millions of mobile nodes to be operating in the Internet within 
coming years. Thus, we must multiply the number of host-specific routes 
suggested by the first two items by a million or so in order to determine the 
full impact of this solution. 
 Unless host-specific routes are propagated to a much larger set of routers than 
the minimal set described in the first item above, then host-specific routing 
negates the Internet’s ability to route around isolated node and link failures. 
 There are serious security implications to using host-specific routes to 
accomplish node mobility in the Internet, which would require authentication 
and complicated key management protocols to address. 
2.1.3 Changing a node’s IP address 
If host-specific routing is not an acceptable solution to node mobility, then how 
about simply changing a node’s IP address as it moves from link to link? This is the 
question that is set out to answer in this section. 
The two transport-layer protocols in wide use in the Internet are TCP and UDP. Both 
of these protocols have nasty habit of using IP addresses as end-point identifiers. 
A TCP connection within a node is uniquely identified by the following four values: 
IP Source Address, IP Destination Address, TCP Source Port, and TCP Destination 
Port. In fact, the TCP Checksum field in each segment is computed using these four 
fields in addition to the data in the payload of the segment. 
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There is an enormous installed base of IPv4 nodes, all of which assume that these 
four quantities will remain constant over the duration of a TCP connection. This 
installed base would simply drop its connections to a destination node whose IP 
address was to change. Thus all ongoing communications between a mobile node and 
any of these existing nodes would have to be terminated, with the new connections 
being initiated by the mobile node at its new address. Thus changing a mobile node’s 
address as it moves does not solve the problem of node mobility. However, changing 
a node’s IP address as it moves does solve a related problem, known as nomadicity. 
There are new problems that must be dealt with: 
 The nomadic node’s IP address entry in the DNS must be updated every time 
the node changes link. Otherwise, other nodes doing an address lookup would 
receive an old address rather than the nomadic node’s current address. 
 A node that looks up a nomadic node’s IP address must realize that the 
address returned from a name server is subject to change at any moment, and 
in fact might change quite rapidly. 
Changing a node’s IP address does not provide a solution to node mobility, though it 
can be useful solution to node nomadicity. Nomadicity, however, makes it next to 
impossible within the current Internet for another node to initiate contact with a 
nomadic node because the first node can never be sure at what IP address the 
nomadic node can be reached [6]. 
2.1.4 Link layer solution 
There are indeed link-layer solutions to node mobility that have been devised for use 
with Internet-related protocols. However, link-layer solutions are not sufficiently 
generic to provide node mobility on the global Internet. The problems related with 
link-layer solutions are given below [6]: 
 First of all, by definition, link-layer solutions provide node mobility only in 
the context of a single type of medium. Thus, link-layer solutions enable only 
nomadicity between media of different types. 
 Another problem with link-layer solutions is that they inherently necessitate 
N different mobility solutions for each of N possible media over which nodes 
might want to send IP packets. A single solution, which works over all media 
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types, is to be preferred over multiple medium-specific solutions, if such a 
thing is architecturally possible. Mobile IP is such a solution. 
 Finally, link-layer solutions necessarily provide mobility within a limited 
geographic area. Local-area solutions such as 802.11 can provide mobility 
throughout a campus or a building, but unusable once the node leaves this 
area. Wide-area solutions such as Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) can 
provide much more geographically diverse areas in which coverage is 
available. However, the limited throughput of such systems makes a node 
prefer to be connected to another type of medium, if such is available. 
2.1.5 Mobility instead of nomadicity 
If all communications are initiated by the user of a mobile node, and the user does 
not mind shutting down his applications and re-starting them at a new location, then 
nomadicity is indeed sufficient and mobility is not absolutely required. However, 
there are many reasons why mobility is preferable to nomadicity, even in those 
situations where it is not absolutely required. A few of these reasons are listed in this 
section, and most of them involve the virtues of using fixed IP address: 
 Many applications have configurations databases, which depend on IP 
addresses, as opposed to hostnames. In the presence of rapidly changing IP 
addresses, these applications would break. 
 There is a reason to believe that at some point in the future, servers would 
need to become mobile. In this case, clients that know their servers only by 
their IP addresses will be incapable of locating them unless the servers have 
the mobility properties provided by Mobile IP. 
 Some application vendors provide network-licensing systems, which restrict 
access to only those nodes possessing specific ranges of IP addresses. 
Without Mobile IP, a nomadic node, which changes link, would no longer be 
able to obtain a license over the network to use these applications. 
 Some security mechanisms provide access-privileges to node based upon 
their IP address. Mobile nodes employing Mobile IP allow such mechanisms 
to work in the presence of node mobility. 
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 Maintaining a pool of addresses for assignment to nomadic nodes can be 
difficult, and in some cases no assignment mechanism might be available. 
Mobile IP, which lets nodes keep their IP addresses as they move, does not 
exacerbate the problem of the limited availability of IPv4 addresses. 
For these and other reasons, mobility as provided by Mobile IP can be extremely 
useful, even in those situations where it is not absolutely required [6,7]. 
2.2 Introduction to Mobile IP 
Mobile IP is a solution for mobility on the global Internet which is scalable, robust, 
secure, and which allows nodes to maintain all ongoing communications while 
changing links. Specifically, Mobile IP provides a mechanism for routing IP packets 
to mobile nodes, which may be connected to any link while using their permanent IP 
address. 
Mobile IP is a network-layer solution to node mobility in the Internet. By this it 
means that Mobile IP accomplishes its task by setting up the routing tables in 
appropriate nodes, such that IP packets can be sent to mobile nodes not connected to 
their home link. In fact, Mobile IP can be considered to be routing protocol, which 
has very specialized purpose. The purpose of Mobile IP is to allow IP packets to be 
routed to mobile nodes, which could potentially change their location very rapidly. 
As a network-layer protocol, Mobile IP is completely independent of the media over 
which it runs. This is in keeping with the design philosophy behind the Internet 
Protocol itself, which was designed to be independent of the underlying 
characteristics of the links over which it runs. 
Mobile IP solves the primary problem of routing IP packets to mobile nodes, which 
is an enormous first step in providing mobility on the Internet. However, a complete 
mobility solution would involve enhancements to other layers of the protocol stack 
as well. 
2.3 Requirements for Mobile IP 
The requirements [6,26], which drove the design of Mobile IP, are as follows: 
 A mobile node must be able to communicate with other nodes after changing 
its link layer point-of-attachment to the Internet. 
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 A mobile node must be able to communicate using only its home (permanent) 
IP address, regardless of its current link-layer point-of-attachment to the 
Internet. 
 A mobile node must be able to communicate with other computers that do not 
implement the Mobile IP mobility functions. 
 A mobile node must not be exposed to any new security threats those to 
which any fixed node on the Internet is exposed. 
2.4 Mobility for IP Version 4 (Mobile IPv4) 
2.4.1 The main components of Mobile IPv4 
Mobile IP generally uses seven main components, which are described below. 
2.4.1.1 Mobile node 
A Mobile Node is a node which can change its point-of-attachment in the Internet 
from one link to another while maintaining its all ongoing communications and using 
only its (permanent) IP home address [26]. 
2.4.1.2 Home agent 
The home agent is a router with an interface on the mobile node’s home link [6,26] 
which: 
 The mobile node keeps informed of its current location, as represented by its 
care-of address, as the mobile node moves from link to link. 
 In some cases, the home agent advertises reachability to the network-prefix of 
the mobile node’s home address, thereby attracting IP packets that are 
destined to the mobile node’s home address. 
 The home agent intercepts packets destined to the mobile node’s home 
address and tunnels them to the mobile node’s current location. 
2.4.1.3 Foreign agent 
The foreign agent is a router on a mobile node’s foreign link [6,26] which: 
 The foreign agent assists the mobile node in informing its home agent of its 
current care-of address. 
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 In some cases, the foreign agent provides a care-of address and de-tunnels 
packets for the mobile node that have been tunneled by its home agent. 
 The foreign agent serves as a default router for packets generated by the 
mobile node while connected to this foreign link. 
2.4.1.4 Home address 
The home address is an IP address assigned to the mobile node permanently. The 
home address does not change as a mobile node moves from link to link. Rather, a 
mobile node’s home address would change only for the same reasons, and under 
same circumstances, as the address of a stationary host or router would change 
[6,26]. 
2.4.1.5 Home link 
The network-prefix of the mobile node’s home address defines its home link. A 
mobile node’s home link is that link which has been assigned the same network-
prefix as the network-prefix of the mobile node’s home address. A mobile nodes 
home agent is a router that has at least one interface on the mobile node’s home link 
[6,26]. 
2.4.1.6 Foreign link 
The foreign link of a mobile node is that link which has not been assigned the same 
network-prefix as the network-prefix of the mobile node’s home address [6]. 
2.4.1.7 Care-of address 
A care-of address [6,26] is an IP address associated with a mobile node that is 
visiting a foreign link. Properties of a care-of address are given below: 
 A care-of address is specific to the foreign link currently being visited by a 
mobile node. 
 A mobile node’s care-of address generally changes every time the mobile 
node moves from one foreign link to another. 
 Packets destined to a care-of address can be delivered using existing Internet 
routing mechanisms. 
 A care-of address is used as the exit-point of a tunnel from the home agent 
toward the mobile node. 
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 A care-of address is almost never used as the IP Source or the IP Destination 
Address in a mobile node’s conversations with other nodes. Specifically, the 
care-of address will never be returned by a DNS when another node looks up 
the mobile node’s hostname. 
There are two conceptual types of care-of address which are described below: 
 A foreign agent care-of address is an IP address of a foreign agent, which has 
an interface on the foreign link being visited by a mobile node. A foreign 
agent care-of address can be any one of the foreign agent’s IP addresses, so 
long as the foreign agent has at least one interface on the foreign link. Thus, 
the network-prefix of a foreign agent care-of address need not equal the 
network-prefix that has been assigned to the foreign link. A foreign agent 
care-of address can be shared by many mobile nodes simultaneously.[6,26] 
 A collocated care-of address is an IP address temporarily assigned to an 
interface of the mobile node itself. The network-prefix of a collocated care-of 
address must equal the network-prefix that has been assigned to the foreign 
link being visited by a mobile node. This type of care-of address might be 
used by a mobile node in situations where no foreign agents are available on 
the foreign link. A collocated care-of address can be used by only one mobile 
node at a time [6,26]. 
Summarizing, a care-of address is an IP address that is close to a mobile node’s 
visited, foreign link. 
2.4.2 Protocol overview 
The functions, nodes, and protocols of Mobile IP are all interrelated, which makes 
them hard to describe without an annoying number of forward and backward 
references. Therefore, it is described high-level how Mobile IP works: 
1. Home agents and foreign agents advertise their presence on any attached 
links by periodically multicasting or broadcasting special Mobile IP 
messages called Agent Advertisements. 
2. Mobile nodes listen to these Agent Advertisements and examine their 
contents to determine whether they are connected to their home link or 
foreign link. While connected to their respective home links, mobile nodes 
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act just like stationary nodes – that is, they make use of no other Mobile IP 
functionality. The rest of the steps, which follow, therefore, assume that a 
mobile node has discovered that is connected to a foreign link. 
3. A mobile node connected to a foreign link acquires a care-of address. A 
foreign agent care-of address can be read from one of the fields within the 
foreign agent’s Agent Advertisement. A collocated care-of address must be 
acquired by some assignment procedure, such as Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol, the Point-to-Point Protocol’s IP Control Protocol, 
or manual configuration. 
4. The mobile node registers the care-of address acquired in step three with its 
home agent, using message-exchange defined by Mobile IP. In the 
registration procedure, the mobile node asks for service from a foreign 
agent, if one is present on the link. In order to prevent remote denial-of-
service attacks, the registration messages are required to be authenticated. 
5. The home agent or some other router on the home link advertises 
reachability to the network-prefix of the mobile node’s home address, thus 
attracting packets that are destined to the mobile node’s home address. The 
home agent intercepts these packets, possibly by using proxy ARP [26], and 
tunnels them to the care-of address that the mobile node registered in step 
four. 
6. At the care-of address – either the foreign agent or one of the interfaces of 
the mobile node itself – the original packet is extracted from the tunnel and 
then delivered to the mobile node. 
7. In the reverse direction, packets sent by the mobile node are routed directly 
to their destination, without any need for tunneling. The foreign agent 
serves as a router for all packets generated by a visiting mobile node. 
These steps show the case of a mobile node connected to a foreign link and using a 
foreign agent care-of address. The case of a mobile node visiting a foreign link and 
using collocated care-of address is very similar, but introduces some new wrinkles 
[6]. 
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2.4.3 Agent discovery 
Agent Discovery is the process by which: 
 A node determines whether it is currently connected to its home link or a 
foreign link. 
 A node detects whether it has moved from one link to another. 
 A node obtains a care-of address when connected to a foreign link. 
The Mobility Agent Advertisement Extension follows the ICMP Router 
Advertisement fields. It is used to indicate that an ICMP Router Advertisement 
message is also an Agent Advertisement being sent by a mobility agent [26]. 
Agent Discovery consists of two simple messages. 
2.4.3.1 Agent advertisement 
The first, Agent Advertisements are used by agents (home, foreign or both) to 
announce their capabilities to mobile nodes. Specifically, Agent Advertisements are 
periodically transmitted as multicast or broadcasts to each link on which a node is 
configured to perform as a home agent, a foreign agent, or both. This allows a mobile 
node that is connected to such a link to determine whether any agent is presented 
and, if so, their respective identities (IP addresses) and capabilities [6,26]. 
2.4.3.2 Agent solicitation 
Mobile nodes that do not have the patience to wait around for the next periodic 
transmission of an Agent Advertisement send messages of second type, Agent 
Solicitations. The sole purpose of an Agent Solicitation, then, is to force any agent on 
the link to immediately transmit an Agent Advertisement. This is useful in those 
situations where the frequency at which agents are transmitting is too low for a 
mobile node that is moving rapidly from link to link [6,26]. 
2.4.4 Move detection 
There are two ways by which mobile nodes can determine that they have moved 
from one link to another. In next two subsections it is assumed that there is at least 
one agent present on every link to which the mobile node might connect. Then, the 
question is what happens when there are no agents present and, therefore, a mobile 
node hears no advertisements on its current link. 
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2.4.4.1 Move detection using lifetimes 
The first method uses the Lifetime field within the ICMP Advertisement [28] portion 
of an Agent Advertisement. This field effectively tells the mobile node how soon it 
should expect to hear another advertisement from that same agent. Because, 
advertisements can be lost, especially when sent over error-prone, wireless links, 
home agents and foreign agents send advertisements faster than the Lifetime field 
required. 
If a mobile node is registered with a foreign agent, and fails to hear an advertisement 
from that agent within the specified Lifetime, then the mobile node can assume that it 
has moved to a different link or that its foreign agent is terribly confused or broken. 
In either case, the mobile node would be wise to register with the next foreign agent 
from which it receives an Agent Advertisement and to send an Agent Solicitation if 
no such advertisement is forthcoming [6,26]. 
2.4.4.2 Move detection using network-prefixes 
The second method for move detection uses network-prefixes. It is possible to have 
multiple foreign agents on the same link, the mobile node must determine if it 
received the two advertisements on the same or different links. If they were received 
on the same link, then the mobile node need not register with the new foreign agent. 
Otherwise, the mobile node has changed location and should register with a foreign 
agent on the new link. 
To determine whether two advertisements were received on the same link, the mobile 
node computes the network-prefixes of respective advertisements. This computation 
can be performed only if both Agent Advertisements contained the Prefix-Length 
Extensions. 
A mobile node computes the network-prefixes of two advertisements and compares 
them. If they differ, then the mobile node concludes that the two advertisements were 
received on different links. Otherwise, the mobile node concludes they were received 
on same link. In the case of a mobile node comparing a newly received 
advertisement with that of the foreign agent with which it is currently registered, the 
mobile node should register with a foreign agent on the new link if it determines that 
it has moved. 
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Otherwise, if an advertisement is received from another agent on the same link, the 
mobile node concludes that it has moved [6]. 
2.4.4.3 Move detection without advertisements 
Assuming that a mobile node is able to obtain a collocated care-of address, the 
mobile node still must be able to determine when it moves from one agentless link to 
another. There are two ways that a mobile node might infer that such movement has 
occurred. The first is to note whether any forward progress has recently been made in 
any of its open TCP connections. If not, then the mobile node might conclude that it 
has moved since the last time it registered. 
Also, the mobile node can put its network-interface driver into” promiscuous mode”. 
In this mode, the mobile node examines all packets on the link, not just packets 
destined to it. If none of the packets flying across the link have network-prefixes that 
equal the mobile node’s current care-of address, then the mobile node might infer 
that it has moved to a new link from the one on which the care-of address was 
obtained. If so, the mobile node should acquire a new care-of address and register 
with its home agent. 
Both of these methods – TCP progress monitoring and promiscuous link examination 
– require some form of assistance from layers other than the network layer [6,26]. 
2.4.5 Registration 
A mobile node registers whenever it detects that its point-of-attachment to the 
network has changed from one link to another. Also, because these registrations are 
valid only for a specified Lifetime, a mobile node reregisters when it has not moved 
but when its existing registration is due to expire. Mobile IP Registration is the 
process by which: 
 A mobile node requires routing services from a foreign agent on a foreign 
link. 
 A mobile node informs its home agent of its current care-of address. 
 A mobile node renews a registration, which is due to expire. 
 A mobile node deregisters when it returns to its home link. 
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Some of the more subtle capabilities of Registration are also described which allow a 
mobile node to: 
 have multiple, simultaneous care-of addresses registered with its home agent, 
wherein the home agent tunnels a copy of packets destined to the mobile 
node’s home address to each of the multiple care-of addresses; 
 deregisters a specific care-of address while retaining others; and 
 dynamically ascertain the address of a potential home agent, if the mobile 
node has no prior knowledge of its home agent. 
Mobile IP Registration follows Mobile IP Agent Discovery. When a mobile node 
detects that it is connected to its home link, it deregisters with its home agent and 
begins acting like any fixed host or router. 
When the mobile node detects that it is connected to a foreign link, it acquires a care-
of address and registers this care-of address with its home agent, possibly via a 
foreign agent. 
2.4.5.1 Registration messages 
Mobile IP Registration consists of the exchange of two messages: a Registration 
Request and a Registration Reply. A registration messages is carried within data 
portion of a UDP segment, which is in turn placed within the payload portion of an 
IP packet. 
A Registration Request message is sent by a mobile node to begin the registration 
process. In some instances the Registration Request is sent directly to the mobile 
node’s home agent. In other cases, it is sent via an objectionable, relays it to the 
mobile node’s home agent. 
The home agent receives the Registration Request and sends back to the mobile node 
a Registration Reply, which, among other things, tells the mobile node whether or 
not its attempted registration was successful. 
If a mobile node does not receive the Registration Reply within a reasonable period 
of time, then the mobile node retransmits the Registration Request a number of times 
until it does receive a Reply. 
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2.4.5.2 Registration scenarios 
There are three most common scenarios for registration [6], which are as follows: 
1. A mobile node registers on a foreign link using a foreign agent’s care-of 
address: 
Routers and Links
Mobile node
Foreign
Agent
Home Agent
Home link
Registration request messages
Registration replay messages
1
3
2
4
Foreign link
 
Figure 2.1. Registration scenario 1 of a mobile node 
2. A mobile node registers on a foreign link using a collocated care-of address: 
Mobile node 1
2
Routers and
Links
Home Agent
Registration request message
Registration replay message
Foreign link Home link
 
Figure 2.2. Registration scenario 2 of a mobile node 
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3. A mobile node deregisters upon returning to its home network: 
Mobile node
1
2
Routers and
Links
Home Agent
Registration request message
Registration replay message
Home link
 
Figure 2.3. Registration scenario 3 of a mobile node 
2.4.5.3 A mobile node registration time 
A mobile node always begins the registration process when it detects that it has 
moved from one link to another. There are other circumstances under which it should 
register, even if it has not changed links. For example, the mobile node should 
register when it detects that its current foreign agent has rebooted. Also, the mobile 
node should reregister when its current registration is due to expire soon [6,26]. 
2.4.5.4 The time of sending registration request by a mobile node 
The mobile node uses the information it learned through Agent Discovery to 
determine which of the registration scenario applies, and it builds its Registration 
Request accordingly. 
For a mobile node, the trickiest part about registration is figuring out the Link-Layer 
Destination Address of the frame in which it places the Registration Request 
message for transmission on its current link. On the home link this is easy – the 
mobile node uses the ARP to determine the home agent’s link-layer address, and 
sends the frame accordingly. 
On foreign links, however, it is very dangerous for a mobile node to transmit ARP 
frames that contain its home address. This is because other nodes on the foreign link 
will get terribly confused if they place the mobile node’s home address into their 
respective ARP tables, especially if these nodes attach to multiple links. Therefore, 
as rule, a mobile node must never send an ARP frame containing its home address on 
a foreign link. 
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When registering via a foreign agent, then, the mobile node should record the foreign 
agent’s link-layer address from the Link-Layer Source Address field of that foreign 
agent’s Agent Advertisements. The mobile node should use this address as the Link-
Layer Destination Address of the frame, which carries Registration Request message. 
Finally, it is assumed that the same method by which a mobile node acquires a 
collocated care-of address will also provide the mobile node with the IP address of a 
default router on the foreign link. This router will be the first hop for the Registration 
Request. In this situation, the mobile node may ARP for its default router’s link-layer 
address, provided that the mobile node’s ARP Request message contains its care-of 
address and not its home address. 
2.4.5.5 A registration request processing by a foreign agent 
In this subsection, it is assumed that the mobile node is registering via a foreign 
agent. Upon receipt of a Registration Request, the foreign agent applies a sequence 
of validity checks. If any of them fail, then the foreign agent rejects the registration 
by sending a Registration Reply to the mobile node with a Code field indicating the 
cause of the rejection. Some reasons that a foreign agent might reject a registration 
are as follows: 
 The mobile node included a Mobile-Foreign Authentication Extension, which 
included an invalid Authenticator field. 
 The mobile node requested a Lifetime, which exceeds the maximum value, 
permitted by the foreign agent. 
 The foreign agent has insufficient resources to handle any additional mobile 
nodes. 
If all is well with the mobile node’s Registration Request, then the foreign agent 
relays it to the mobile node’s home agent. The foreign agent consumes the original 
IP and UDP headers that contained the Registration Request and creates new ones for 
transmission to the home agent. The new UDP/IP packet contains the same payload, 
as did the original packet. The IP Destination Address of the new packet is read from 
the home agent field of the Registration request, and the IP Source Address is the IP 
address of the foreign agent on the interface over which it will transmit the packet 
[6,26]. 
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2.4.5.6 A registration request processing by a home agent 
Upon receipt of a Registration Request, a home agent performs a set of validity 
checks not unlike those performed by a foreign agent. If the Registration Request is 
invalid for any reasons, the home agent sends a Registration Replay to the mobile 
node with a suitable Code field indicating the reasons for the failure. 
If the Registration Request is valid, then the home agent updates the mobile node’s 
binding entries. Finally, the home agent sends a Registration Reply to the mobile 
node indicating that the registration was successful. The IP Source and Destination 
Address and UDP Source and Destination Port in the Registration Replay are simply 
reversed from the respective fields in the Registration Request [6,26]. 
2.4.5.7 A registration replay processing by a foreign agent 
It is assumed that the mobile node is registering via a foreign agent – otherwise, the 
Registration Replay would be sent directly to the mobile node from the home agent, 
bypassing the foreign agent altogether. Upon receipt of a Registration Reply, the 
foreign agent performs a series of validity checks. 
If the Replay is found to be invalid in any way, then the foreign agent generates a 
new Registration Reply containing suitable rejection Code field and sends it to the 
mobile node. An invalid Reply is one, which fails the foreign agent’s criteria for 
being a legitimate Registration Reply. For example, an invalid Reply is one, which is 
malformed, contains an unrecognized extension, or fails home-agent-to-foreign-agent 
authentication. 
If the Registration Reply is valid, then the foreign agent updates its list of known, 
visiting mobile nodes and relays the Registration Reply to the mobile node, using 
some of the fields it recorded from the original Registration Request to transmit the 
Reply [6]. 
2.4.5.8 A registration replay processing by a mobile node 
Upon receipt of a Registration Reply, the mobile node performs its own sequence of 
validity checks. If the reply is valid, then the mobile node examines the Code field to 
examine whether the registration was accepted or rejected by the home agent (and 
foreign agent, if applicable). 
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If the Code field indicates rejection, then the mobile node can attempt to repair the 
error that caused the rejection and attempt a new registration. Common reasons for 
rejection include excessive Lifetimes and invalid Identification fields. 
If the Code field indicate acceptance, then the mobile node adjust its routing table as 
appropriate for the current link and begins (or continues) communicating [6,26]. 
2.4.5.9 The mobile node ping-pong back and forth between wireless cells 
The area over which the signal from a wireless transmitter can be accurately received 
is referred to as its coverage area. The coverage area, or cell, of a transmitter rarely 
looks like hexagons. Instead, the cells generally overlap each other. 
In fact, the situation is even worse than this, because the shapes of the cells tend to 
vary with time. This variation makes it possible for a mobile node, which is receiving 
a first transmitter to lose contact with that transmitter and begin receiving the signal 
from a second transmitter without moving an inch. If each wireless cell was its own 
link, each having been assigned a unique network-prefix, then the mobile node could 
potentially be changing links very rapidly, despite remaining completely still. This 
would generate a tremendous number of Mobile IP Registrations, since the mobile 
node must register every time it changes link. 
There are two solutions to this problem of rapid mobility across wireless cells. One is 
outside the Mobile IP and involves link-layer mechanisms. The other uses Mobile 
IP’s simultaneous binding capability. These two solutions are described below: 
The link-layer solution involves making the cells of a wireless network from a few 
large links. A bridge is a network element, which makes several media segments, 
appears as one link. The use of bridges in this way prevents every change of cell 
from likewise being a change of link, and therefore requiring a new Mobile IP 
Registration. Rather link-layer-specific mechanisms are used to accomplish 
“handoffs” between cells that are part of the same link- then Mobile IP is used to 
accomplish mobility between cells that are part of different links [6]. 
The second solution uses Mobile IP’s simultaneous binding capability to reduce the 
number of registrations. The S bit in the Registration Request – if set to 1 – indicates 
to the home agent that the mobile node wishes to create a binding for the specified 
care-of address, but wishes to leave all existing bindings unmodified. For example, if 
a mobile node has registered a care-of address on the first link and then registers 
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another care-of address on a second link, the home agent of the mobile node will 
then have two bindings for the mobile node – one for each of these respective care-of 
addresses. 
Packets sent to a mobile node’s home address are intercepted by its home agent and 
tunneled to its care-of address. In actuality, the home agent tunnels a copy of packets 
to every one of the care-of addresses that have been registered by the mobile node. 
A mobile node is located at the border between two wireless cells where they are 
physically separated. If the mobile node is moving back and forth between two cells, 
it can register a care-of address on both links. Then the mobile node simply receives 
a tunneled packet from the transmitter in whichever cell it happens to be receiving at 
the current moment. The other packet (sent by the other transmitter) will likely be 
lost, though there is also a chance that the mobile node, too, will receive it. In either 
case, IP does not guarantee that exactly one copy of a packet will arrive at its 
ultimate destination – in fact, TCP/IP implementations are specifically required to 
accommodate the receipt of zero, one, or multiple copies of an IP packet. 
Thus, the simultaneous-binding feature of Mobile IP can be used to prevent large 
number of registrations by a mobile node that is on the border between two wireless 
cells. Support for this feature is optional by home agents, however. A home agent, 
which does not support multiple simultaneous bindings, does not reject a 
Registration Request in which this feature is requested. 
It is unclear whether this feature of Mobile IP has any applicability in the real world, 
however. Most wireless systems with overlapping coverage areas tend to be architect 
as suggested earlier in this section. Namely, numerous cells tend to be grouped 
together into confederations which form a single link as viewed by the network layer 
(IP), with a mobile node using link-layer handoffs to maintain connectivity as it 
moves within a single confederation of cells [6]. 
2.4.6 Routing in Mobile IPv4 
It is described a major topic area of Mobile IP – the procedures by which packets are 
routed to and from mobile nodes, depending upon their current location. 
There are two primary cases: a mobile node connected to its home link and a mobile 
node connected to a foreign link. 
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2.4.6.1 A mobile node at home link 
Packets destined to a mobile node’s home address are routed to the mobile node’s 
home link as a result of the normal functioning of network-prefix routing. Thus, no 
special routing procedures are required to deliver packets to a mobile node that is 
connected to its home link. This implies that the rules for routing packets to a mobile 
node, which is connected to its home link, are identical to the rules for routing 
packets to any conventional IP host or router. 
In addition, no special rules are needed to route packets generated by a mobile node 
that is connected to its home link. Likely, any host or router, such a mobile node uses 
its routing table to select an appropriate Next Hop for any packet it generates. 
Similarly, no special rules are needed for populating with entries the routing table of 
a mobile node while it is connected to its home link [6]. 
2.4.6.2 A mobile node at foreign link 
In this subsection it is described how unicast packets are routed to and from a mobile 
node that is connected to a foreign link. The procedures for routing packets to a 
mobile node that is connected to a foreign link can be summarized as follows: 
 A router on the home link, possibly the home agent, advertises reachability to 
the network-prefix, which equals that of the mobile node’s home address. 
 Packets destined to the mobile node’s home address are therefore routed 
toward its home link and specifically toward the mobile node’s home agent. 
 The home agent intercepts packets destined to the mobile node, assuming the 
mobile node has registered one or more care-of addresses, and tunnels a copy 
to each such care-of address. 
 At each care-of address – an address of a foreign agent or an address 
collocated with the mobile node itself – the original packet is extracted from 
the tunnel and delivered to the mobile node. 
In both cases – a foreign agent care-of address and a collocated care-of address – the 
home agent receives a packet destined to one of its mobile nodes and looks up the 
corresponding bindings. The home agent then tunnels the packet to the care-of 
address, not knowing or caring whether the mobile node or a foreign agent is the 
tunnel exit-point. Thus, in both cases, the encapsulated (inner) packet is from the 
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host to the mobile node’s home address, and in the both cases the encapsulating 
(outer) packet is from the home agent to the care-of address. 
In the case of the foreign agent care-of address, when the foreign agent receives the 
tunneled packet, it removes the encapsulating (outer) packet to recover the 
encapsulated (inner, original) packet. It then sees that the IP Destination Address is 
that of a registered mobile node, looks up the appropriate interface, and sends the 
packet to the mobile node. In the case of collocated care-of address, the mobile node 
performs similar processing upon receiving the tunneled packet. The mobile node 
removes the outer packet to recover the original packet, and ultimately passes the 
contents of the original packet up the stack to the higher-layer protocol. 
All home agents and foreign agents are required to implement IP in IP Encapsulation 
[29] for tunneling purposes. In addition, they may implement Minimal Encapsulation 
within IP [30] and Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [31]. Mobile nodes, which 
are capable of operating with a collocated care-of address, have identical 
requirements with respect to tunneling [6,26]. 
2.4.6.3 Source routing 
IP Version 4 defines an IP Header Option called the Loose Source and Record Route 
Option. This option lists one or more intermediate destinations that a packet 
containing the option must visit along its journey to its final destination. 
When a router receives the packet, it inspects the options and realizes that it is only 
an intermediate destination. It then grabs the next address in the Loose Source and 
Record Route Option – the destination host – and forwards the packet to the Next 
Hop along the path to the destination host. Before forwarding the packet, the router 
“records” its own IP address within the Loose Source and Record Route Option. 
Specifically, the router records its IP address on the interface over which it forwards 
the packet. 
When the packet arrives at the destination host, it inspects the options and determines 
that it is the ultimate destination of the packet. Therefore, the destination host 
“consumes” the packet by passing it to the higher-layer protocol indicated by the IP 
Protocol field. The option specifies that when a destination host responds to a source 
host that included the Loose Source and Record Route Option in its packets, that 
destination host should include a “reversed” source routing option in the response 
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packet. In this example, the original destination host would include a Loose Source 
and Record Route Option specifying the same router as an intermediate destination 
when sending packets back to the original source host. 
Whenever a mobile node has a packet to send to a correspondent, the mobile node 
includes a Loose Source and Record Route Option in the packet specifying its 
current care-of address as an intermediate destination. Then, when the correspondent 
replies to the mobile node, it reverses the source route and the packet is routed to the 
mobile node via its care-of address. 
The mobile node still requires a home agent, though, for correspondents that do not 
know the mobile node’s current care-of address. For these correspondents, packets to 
the mobile node are sent normally, in which case they are routed to the home link, 
where they are intercepted by the home agent and loose-source routed to the mobile 
node via the care-of address. Obviously, then, the mobile node would still be 
required to register its care-of address with its home agent. 
There are three primary reasons why Mobile IP working group as a solution rejected 
source routing. The first reason is that the Loose Source and Record Route Option, 
despite having been defined in the original IPv4 specification [2], is rarely, if ever, 
implemented correctly in IPv4 hosts. Some needs simply drop all packets that 
contain this option. Others actually crash upon receiving IP packets containing 
options. Finally, few, if any, implementations actually reverse the source route, even 
though this was a requirement of the IPv4 specification. 
The second reason is that IP packets containing options require additional processing 
by every router along the path from source to destination – not just the routers listed 
in the source routing option! This is because each router to see if they contain an 
option that might be relevant to that router before it forwards the packet must parse 
the options. Conversely, packets that do not contain options can generally be routed 
very quickly, often in hardware, which allows current router technology to route IP 
packets at pretty blazing speeds. A packet containing any IP option can experience as 
much as a 10-to-1-performance penalty in some commercial routers. This was 
deemed to be an unacceptable performance penalty, especially when compared with 
tunneling which requires only two routers to do “special” processing – the home 
agent and the tunnel exit-point. 
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The final reason that loose-source routing was deemed unacceptable relates to 
security. A Bad Guy could send a packet to a mobile node’s correspondent 
specifying some bogus care-of address as an intermediate destination in a loose-
source route. This would cause the correspondent to reverse the source route, 
specifying this bogus care-of address as an intermediate destination in its replies. At 
this point, the mobile node is cut off from communicating this correspondent, and the 
Bad Guy gets to see a copy of all packets sent by that correspondent to the mobile 
node. This problem could be eliminated with the proper use of authentication, but it 
has the same key management problems as route optimization [6]. 
2.4.6.4 Triangle routing 
Packets that are sent by a correspondent to a mobile node connected to a foreign link 
are routed first to the mobile node’s home agent and then tunneled to the mobile 
node’s care-of address. However, packets sent by the mobile node are routed directly 
to the correspondent, thus forming a triangle as shown in Figure 2.4. The question is 
why does not the mobile node inform correspondents of its care-of address and have 
them tunnel directly to the mobile node, bypassing the home agent? This optimized 
routing is potentially more efficient in terms of delay and resource consumption than 
is triangle routing, because, in general, the packets will have to traverse fewer links 
on their way to their destination.  
Home Agent
Correspondent
Mobile Node
Triangle routing
 
Figure 2.4. Triangle routing 
The main obstacle to route optimization relates to security. For a correspondent to 
tunnel directly to a mobile node, the correspondent must be informed of the mobile 
node’s current care-of address. Note the similarity between this and Mobile IP 
Registration, the purpose of which is to inform a mobile node’s home agent of the 
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mobile node’s current care-of address. Without strong authentication in the messages 
that inform a mobile node’s correspondent of its current care-of address, trivial 
denial-of service attacks would be possible to perform with respect to 
correspondents. 
Specifically, a Bad Guy needs only to send a bogus registration to the mobile node’s 
correspondent in order to cut off all communication between the two nodes. This is 
the challenge presented by any attempts to optimize the routing in Mobile IP. It is 
conceivable that a network administrator could configure a secret key between a 
mobile node and its home agent, in order to protect the registration messages against 
forgeries. It is not practical, however, to likewise distribute keys between a mobile 
node and every other node with which it might correspond. In the absence of 
automated mechanisms, distributing keys between a mobile node and its 
correspondents is simply unworkable [6,26]. 
2.4.6.5 Routing of broadcast datagram 
A mobile node can obtain a copy of broadcasts that are transmitted on its home link, 
even when the mobile node is currently connected to a foreign link. The mobile node 
requests that its home agent forward all broadcasts by setting B bit in its Registration 
Requests. This instructs the home agent to deliver a copy of all such broadcasts via a 
tunnel to the mobile node. The exact delivery mechanism depends upon whether the 
mobile node is using a foreign agent care-of address or a collocated care-of address. 
A mobile node with a collocated care-of address receives broadcast packets in 
exactly the same way as it receives unicast packets. Namely, its home agent tunnels 
the broadcast packet to the mobile node’s collocated care-of address, the mobile node 
de-tunnels the packet, and the mobile node passes the encapsulated (inner) broadcast 
packet to the higher layer. A mobile node using a collocated care-of address must set 
the D bit to 1 in its Registration Request, to inform its home agent that the mobile 
node itself is decapsulating packets. 
A mobile node with a foreign agent care-of address receives broadcast packets far 
differently from the way in which it receives unicast packets. Consider what would 
happen if the home agent simply tunneled broadcast packets to the foreign agent’s 
care-of address. The foreign agent would de-tunnel the packet and then have 
absolutely no clue what to do with it, because the IP Destination Address of the 
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encapsulated (inner) packet would be a broadcast address and the foreign agent 
would not know which mobile node was supported to receive it. Thus, the foreign 
agent would not know on which interface to transmit the de-tunneled broadcast 
packet. 
For this reason, a home agent must use nested encapsulation to deliver broadcast 
packets to mobile nodes, which have registered a foreign agent, care-of address. 
First, the home agent encapsulates a broadcast within a first encapsulating packet 
with IP Source Address equal to the home agent’s address and IP Destination 
Address equal to the mobile node’s home address. Then, the home agent 
encapsulates this first encapsulating packet within a second packet with IP Source 
Address equal to the home agent’s address and IP Destination Address equal to the 
care-of address. 
In this way, when the doubly encapsulated packet arrives at the care-of address, the 
foreign agent decapsulates (once) and sees a unicast packet that’s Source Address is 
the home agent’s address and whose Destination Address is the mobile node’s home 
address. This packet looks like any other unicast packet that the home agent might 
tunnel for delivery to the mobile node. Therefore, the foreign agent looks in its 
routing table and sends the packet to the mobile node over the appropriate link. 
Further, this unicast packet contains the encapsulated broadcast packet, which must 
be de-tunneled by the mobile node before being passed the higher-layer protocol 
[26]. 
The way in which a mobile node sends broadcasts is independent of whether it has a 
collocated or a foreign agent care-of address. However, transmission of broadcasts 
by mobile nodes does depend upon the type of broadcast, as specified by the 
following three cases: 
 If the destination is a link-specific broadcast (255.255.255.255) intended for 
the mobile node’s foreign link, and then the mobile node simply transmits the 
packet on the foreign link, using the link-layer broadcast address to deliver 
the frame containing this packet to all nodes on the link. 
 If the destination is a link-specific broadcast (255.255.255.255) intended for 
the mobile node’s home link, then the mobile node must tunnel this packet to 
its home agent. The encapsulating (outer) packet has an IP Source Address 
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equal to the mobile node’s home address, and the IP Destination Address is 
the mobile node’s home agent. 
 If the destination is a prefix-specific broadcast (network-prefix.11...11), then 
the mobile node has two alternatives. First, it can tunnel the packet to its 
home agent. Second, the mobile node can transmit the packet normally; 
sending it in a link-layer frame that’s Link-Layer Destination Address is that 
of its router, just like any unicast packet transmitted by the mobile node. 
However, some intermediate routers might be configured to filter broadcast 
packets, in which case a mobile node will be better off tunneling such packets 
to its home agent. 
Thus, mobile nodes can participate in broadcasts either as senders or receivers, 
simply by setting the appropriate bits (B and D) in their Registration Requests and 
using the procedures described above [6,26]. 
2.4.6.6 Routing of multicast datagram 
IP multicasts are, by definition, those packets with IP Destination Address whose 
four leftmost bits are “1110” – that is, they have the form 1110.multicast-group. In 
dotted-decimal notation, the range of IP multicast addresses, also known as Internet 
Class D Address, is therefore 224.0.0.1 through 239.255.255.255. 
Any node can send a packet to a multicast group, simply by building an IP packet in 
which the IP Destination Address is set to the group’s multicast address. Senders do 
not need to be members of a group in order to send multicasts to the receivers of that 
group. A node joins a multicast group, and therefore becomes a receiver of the 
packets sent to that group, by sending special messages to multicast routers. A 
multicast router is a router that is capable of routing multicast packets. 
The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) defines the messages that nodes 
use to join multicast groups. Specifically, nodes send IGMP Host Membership 
Reports to express their desire to join multicast groups. IGMP is considered to be a 
part of network layer. Also IGMP messages are carried within the payload portion of 
IP packets. 
Unlike IP unicast and IP broadcast packets, IP multicast packets are routed based 
upon both the IP Destination Address and the IP Source Address. The IP Source 
Address must be topologically correct; that is, the network-prefix of the IP Source 
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Address must equal to the network-prefix of the link of which the IP multicast is 
originated. Equivalently stated, a node, which sends a multicast packet, must be 
connected to its home link. Obviously, this causes problems for mobile nodes that are 
currently connected to a foreign link [6]. 
A mobile node that is connected to a foreign link must not send multicast packets 
directly on that network using its home address as the IP Source Address; otherwise, 
multicast routers will not be able to deliver the packets to all of the group’s receivers. 
Such a mobile node has two options for sending multicasts. First, the mobile node 
can tunnel them to its home agent, in exactly the way as specified for broadcast 
packets. This method requires the mobile node’s home agent to be a multicast router; 
that is, the home agent must be capable of forwarding IP multicast packets. 
Alternatively, a mobile node that has an acquired a collocated care-of address can 
use that address as the IP Source Address of its multicast packets and send them 
directly to the foreign link. This method requires that one or more multicast routers 
be present on the foreign link. Further, this method is only useful if the multicast 
application does not use the IP Source Address of multicast packets as identity of 
sender, since a mobile node’s care-of address changes when it moves [6]. 
A receiver must send IGMP Host Membership Reports on its attached network to 
inform a neighboring multicast router that the node whishes to receive multicasts for 
a specified group. A mobile node that is connected to a foreign link has two options 
available if it wishes to receive multicasts. 
The first option is for the mobile node to tunnel IGMP packets to its home agent – 
which assumes that its home agent is also a multicast router. The home agent then 
adds the mobile node to the multicast delivery tree [6]. To actually deliver multicast 
packets, the home agent tunnels them to the mobile node. The form of these tunneled 
packets depends on whether the mobile node is using a foreign agent care-of address 
or a collocated care-of address, and the mechanism is exactly the same as it is 
described for broadcast packets in Receiving Broadcasts with a foreign agent care-of 
address and Receiving Broadcasts with a collocated care-of address. 
This first option, in which the mobile node joins the multicast delivery tree by way of 
its home agent, is useful in those situations where the multicast group is 
administratively restricted to a specific set of networks owned, for instance, by a 
 40 
single corporation. In such a case, multicast packets tunneled to the mobile node by 
its home agent can be encrypted, authenticated, or both if the mobile node is 
currently connecting via a public, untrusted network. 
The second option for a mobile node that wishes to receive multicasts is for the 
mobile node to send IGMP Host Membership Reports directly on the foreign link. 
This assumes that there is at least one multicast router present on the foreign link. If 
the mobile node has a collocated care-of address, then the mobile node should use 
this address as the IP Source Address of its IGMP packets, though a mobile node 
with a foreign agent care-of address may use its home address to send these packets. 
The reason the latter is permissible is that the IGMP messages merely inform the 
neighboring multicast router that there is a receiver present – the multicast router 
normally does not care about the identity of receiver. 
The second option, in which the mobile node joins the multicast delivery tree by way 
of a multicast router on a foreign link, might be more efficient than joining by way of 
its home agent. This would be the case when there are many receivers of single 
multicast group simultaneously connected to the same network. In the first method, 
each such receiver would obtain a private copy of the multicast via a tunnel from its 
home agent, which further implies many transmissions on the foreign link. In the 
second method, the multicast router transmits each individual multicast packet only 
once on the foreign link. 
Finally, a mobile node that joins a group via a router on a foreign link must rejoin 
that group when it moves to a new link, if it wishes to remain a member of that group 
[6,26]. 
2.4.7 Tunneling 
The tunnel is the path followed by a datagram while it is encapsulated. The model is 
that, while it is encapsulated, a datagram is routed to a knowledgeable decapsulating 
agent, which decapsulates the datagram and then correctly delivers it to its ultimate 
destination [26]. 
First, IP Fragmentation is described shortly, since fragmented IP packets affect 
which type of encapsulation methods can be used by a tunnel entry-point. Then it is 
described the three types of tunneling used by Mobile IP: IP in IP Encapsulation, 
Minimal Encapsulation, and GRE. 
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2.4.7.1 IP fragmentation 
Many link layers and the hardware over which they run place the upper limit on the 
size of a frame that they are capable of transferring. This limit, called the link MTU 
(Maximum Transfer Unit), in turn limits the maximum size of an IP packet that may 
be transferred within a single frame. An IP packet, which is larger than the link MTU 
of the link over which it is to be forwarded must be fragmented before it, may be 
transmitted. Fragmentation is the process by which a large IP packet is chopped up 
into smaller pieces in order for the smaller pieces to fit within a link’s MTU. 
IP fragmentation is performed either by the original source of a packet or by a router 
along the path to the ultimate destination. The fragments are created in such a way as 
to be reassembled at the ultimate destination of the original packet. The exception is 
fragmentation that occurs within a tunnel, where the tunnel fragments are 
reassembled at the tunnel’s exit-point, which, in fact, is the ultimate destination of 
the tunneling packet. 
2.4.7.2 IP in IP encapsulation 
IP in IP Encapsulation [29] provides a standard method of encapsulating IPv4 
packets within the payload portion of another IPv4 packet. Unlike Minimal 
Encapsulation, IP in IP Encapsulation works in all cases, whether the original IP 
packet is fragmented or not. 
IP in IP Encapsulation requires more overhead – 20 bytes versus 8 or 12 – than 
Minimal Encapsulation. By maintaining soft state, tunnel entry points can relay 
ICMP messages generated within the tunnel to the original source of an offending 
packet [6]. 
2.4.7.3 Minimal encapsulation 
Minimal Encapsulation [30] can save usually 8 bytes over IP in IP Encapsulation but 
carries with it the following disadvantages: 
 It does not work when an original packet is already fragmented. 
 It results in the Time to Live of the original packet being decremented at 
every router within the tunnel, which increases the change that a mobile node 
is reached if its home agent uses Minimal Encapsulation. 
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 Its mysteriously chosen packet layout does not put the Original Source 
Address in an area that guarantees it will be returned by an ICMP message 
within the tunnel, implying that a tunnel entry-point still has to implement 
soft state in order to relay such messages to the original source of the packet. 
2.4.7.4 Generic routing encapsulation (GRE) 
Generic Routing Encapsulation [31] is the final tunneling method accommodated by 
Mobile IP. GRE supports other network-layer protocols in addition to IP. It allows a 
packet of a first protocol suite to be encapsulated within the payload portion of a 
packet of a second protocol suite. This is in contrast to IP in IP Encapsulation and 
Minimal Encapsulation, both of which support only IP. 
2.5 Mobility for IP Version 6 (Mobile IPv6) 
This section discusses mobility support for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6). IPv6 
is the next generation of the Internet Protocol, which will ultimately replace IPv4 as 
the primary network-layer protocol of the Internet. 
The Mobile IPv6 protocol is just as suitable for mobility across homogeneous media 
as for mobility across heterogeneous media. For example, Mobile IPv6 facilitates 
node movement from one Ethernet segment to another as well as it facilitates node 
movement from an Ethernet segment to a wireless LAN cell, with the mobile node's 
IP address remaining unchanged in spite of such movement [27]. 
Mobile IPv6 does not attempt to solve all general problems related to the use of 
mobile computers or wireless networks. In particular, this protocol does not attempt 
to solve: 
 Handling links with partial reachability, or unidirectional connectivity, such 
as are often found in wireless networks. 
 Access control on a link being visited by a mobile node. 
 Local or hierarchical forms of mobility management (similar to many current 
link-layer mobility management solutions). 
 Assistance for adaptive applications. 
 Mobile routers. 
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 Service Discovery. 
 Distinguishing between packets lost due to bit errors vs. network congestion 
[27]. 
2.5.1 The basic operation of Mobile IPv6 
The operation of Mobile IPv6 can be summarized as follows [6]: 
 A mobile node determines its current location using the IPv6 version of 
Router Discovery. 
 The mobile node acts like any fixed host or router when connected to its 
home link; otherwise, in the case of a foreign link. 
 A mobile node uses IPv6-defined address autoconfiguration to acquire a 
(collocated) care-of address on the foreign link. 
 The mobile node notifies its home agent of its care-of address. 
 The mobile node also reports its care-of address to select correspondents, 
assuming it can do securely. 
 Packets sent by correspondents that are ignorant of the mobile node’s care-of 
address are routed just as in Mobile IPv4 – namely, they are routed to the 
mobile node’s home network, where the home agent tunnels them to the care-
of address. 
 Packets sent by correspondents that know the mobile node’s care-of address 
are sent directly to the mobile node using IPv6 Routing Header, which 
specifies the mobile node’s care-of address as an intermediate destination. 
 In the reverse direction, packets sent by a mobile node are routed directly to 
their destination using no special mechanisms; however, in the presence of 
ingress filtering, the mobile node can tunnel packets to its home agent using 
its care-of address as the IP Source Address of the tunnel. 
2.5.2 Location determination 
This subsection describes Mobile IPv6 Agent Discovery, the process by which a 
mobile node: 
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 Determines whether it is currently connected to its home link or a foreign 
link. 
 Detects whether it has moved from one link to another. 
 Obtains a care-of address when connected to a foreign link. 
2.5.2.1 Router discovery 
ICMPv6 Router Discovery is very similar to Mobile IPv4 Agent Discovery. Router 
Discovery defined in the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery document [20], consists of two 
messages: Router Solicitations and Router Advertisements. As before Router 
Advertisements are periodically transmitted as broadcasts by routers and home 
agents on each of their attached link. Mobile nodes that are too impatient to wait for 
the next periodically transmitted Router Advertisements send router Solicitations. As 
in Mobile IPv4, Router Discovery messages do not require to be authenticated. 
First of all, the mobile node examines the network-prefixes contained in received 
advertisements. If any of these prefixes match the network-prefix of the mobile 
node’s home address, then the mobile node is connected to its home link. At this 
point, the mobile node should inform its home agent that it has returned home. 
Otherwise, if none of prefixes matches the network-prefix of the mobile node’s home 
address, then the mobile node is connected to a foreign link. At this point, the mobile 
node compares the prefixes in the most recently received advertisement with those of 
previous advertisements to see if it has moved. 
2.5.2.2 Obtaining a care-of address 
There are two methods by which a mobile node can acquire a care-of address, once it 
determines that it is connected to a foreign link. Recall that there is no such thing as a 
foreign agent in Mobile IPv6, so the only type of care-of address in the Mobile IPv6 
is the collocated care-of address. A mobile node uses the M bit at any received 
Router Advertisements to determine which method should be used. If M bit is equal 
to 1, then the mobile node uses Stateful Address Autoconfiguration; otherwise the 
mobile node uses Stateless Address Autoconfiguration [10,19]. 
Mobile nodes can acquire a care-of address by Stateful Address Autoconfiguration, 
which is fancy way of saying, “from a server that remembers what address it handed 
out of whom”. In this method, the mobile node simply asks a server for an address 
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and uses that address as a care-of address. As in IPv4, one protocol for “stateful” 
address assignment is the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6). 
DHCPv6 is very similar to DHCP for IPv4. Also PPP’s IPv6 Configuration Protocol 
provides a method by which a server can provide a mobile node with a care-of 
address [6]. 
Mobile nodes can also acquire a care-of address by “Stateless Address 
Autoconfiguration”, which is a fancy way of saying “automatically”. Stateless 
Address Autoconfiguration [10,19] is new to IPv6, meaning that there is no similar 
functionality defined in IPv4. Simplifying greatly, Stateless Address 
Autoconfiguration works as follows: 
 The mobile node first forms an interface token, a link-dependent identifier for 
the interface by which it connects to the foreign link. The interface token is 
typically the node’s link-layer address on that interface. For example, on 
Ethernet, the interface token would be the mobile node’s 48-bit Ethernet 
address. 
 The mobile node examines the Prefix Information Options that are contained 
within Router Advertisements to determine the valid network-prefix on the 
current link. 
 The mobile node forms a care-of address by concatenating one of the valid 
network prefixes with the interface token. 
Address Autoconfiguration, both stateful and stateless, contains mechanisms by 
which a node can determine whether the address it has acquired is identical to an 
address being used by any other node on the link. If there is such a duplicate address, 
then the autoconfiguration protocols define ways in which a unique address can be 
acquired by the node [6]. 
2.5.3 Notification 
This subsection describes the Mobile IPv6 equivalent of Mobile IPv4 Registration, 
which is used by mobile nodes to inform their home agent and various other nodes of 
their current care-of address. The term Notification is used because Mobile IPv6 
Notification is very different from Mobile IPv4 Registration. 
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Mobile IPv6 Notification is the method by which a mobile node informs both its 
home agent and various correspondent nodes of its current care-of address. The home 
agent uses the care-of address as the exit point of a tunnel to get packets to the 
mobile node when it is connected to a foreign link, as in Mobile IPv4. In addition, 
correspondent nodes use the care-of address to route packets directly to the mobile 
node, without requiring the packet to be routed first to the mobile node’s home agent. 
Thus, Mobile IPv6 has built-in support for route optimization. Mobile nodes must 
also notify their home agents when they return to their home link. 
Like Mobile IPv4 Registration, Notification consists of a simple exchange of 
messages. However, Mobile IPv6 Notification uses an extension to the IPv6 packet 
header to realize its exchange, whereas Mobile IPv4 uses messages within the 
payload of UDP/IP packets [6, 27]. 
2.5.3.1 Notification scenarios 
Mobile IPv6 Notification consists of an exchange of a Binding Update and a Binding 
Acknowledgement between a mobile node and a home agent or correspondent node, 
possibly prompted by the mobile node receiving a Binding Request. These message 
exchanges for common scenarios [6] are as follows: 
 A mobile node connects to a foreign link and informs its home agent of its 
new care-of address: 
Mobile node 1
2
Home Agent
Binding Update
Binding Acknowledgment
Foreign link Home link
 
Figure 2.5. Notification scenario 1 of a mobile node 
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 A mobile node connects to a foreign link and informs a correspondent node 
of its new care-of address: 
Mobile node
1
2
Home Agent
Binding Update
Binding Acknowledgment
Foreign link Home link
2
 
Figure 2.6. Notification scenario 2 of a mobile node 
 A mobile node returns to its home link and informs its home agent that is no 
longer attached to a foreign link: 
Mobile node
1
2
Home Agent
Binding Update
Binding Acknowledgment
Home link
 
Figure 2.7. Notification scenario 3 of a mobile node 
2.5.3.2 Notification messages 
In some cases, a correspondent node initiates the notification process by sending a 
Binding Request to a mobile node. Otherwise, the mobile node initiates the process 
by sending a Binding Update. In both cases, the mobile node sends a Binding Update 
to its home agent or a correspondent node to inform them of its current care-of 
address. The mobile node can specify within a Binding Update whether or not the 
receiver should respond by sending a Binding Acknowledgment to the mobile node. 
The Binding Acknowledgment tells the mobile node first that the original Binding 
Update was received and second whether it was accepted or rejected. 
The three messages defined for Mobile IPv6 Notification are Binding Updates, 
Binding Acknowledgments, and Binding Requests. All of these messages are 
encoded as options to be carried within a Destination Options Header. This means 
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that the options are examined only by the ultimate destination and not by any of the 
routers along the path [6]. 
2.5.3.3 Sending time of binding update messages 
A mobile node should send Binding Updates to its home agent and to various 
correspondent nodes. 
A mobile node that moves to a new link acquires a care-of address on that link and 
then immediately sends a Binding Update to its home agent. The Binding Update has 
the H bit set to 1 to indicate that the mobile node expects the receiving node to act as 
its home agent. Also the A bit is set to 1 to request that the home agent send a 
Binding Acknowledgment upon receiving the Binding Update. As in Mobile IPv4, 
the mobile node retransmits the Binding Update until it receives a Binding 
Acknowledgment [6]. 
Correspondent nodes that have received a Binding Update from a mobile node can 
send packets directly to that mobile node without the packets being routed first to the 
mobile node’s home link. Thus, it is desirable for a mobile node to send Binding 
Updates to correspondent nodes with which it will be communicating while 
connected to a given link [6]. 
2.5.4 Routing in Mobile IPv6 
Because mobile nodes send and receive packets just like any other (fixed) node when 
they are connected to their home link, the remainder of this section assumes that a 
mobile node is connected to a foreign link. Also it is assumed that the mobile node 
has already notified its home agent of its current care-of address [27]. 
2.5.4.1 Correspondents that know the care-of address of a mobile node 
A correspondent node that knows a mobile node’s care-of address sends packets 
directly to the mobile node using an IPv6 Routing Header. These packets do not 
necessarily pass through the mobile node’s home agent; rather, they take an optimal 
route from the correspondent node to the mobile node. 
The IPv6 Routing Header, as defined in [27], contains a list of intermediate 
destinations that a packet containing the header must visit along its path to the 
ultimate destination. Note that, especially in Mobile IPv6, a mobile node’s care-of 
address makes a fine choice for such an intermediate destination, since the care-of 
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address is collocated with the mobile node itself. Thus, a correspondent node 
specifies the mobile node’s care-of address as the lone intermediate destination 
within a Routing Header in order to route a packet directly to the mobile node at its 
current location. 
2.5.4.2 Correspondents that do not know the care-of address of a mobile node 
If a correspondent node does not know a mobile node’s care-of address, then it sends 
packets to the mobile node just as it would send packets to any other (fixed) node. In 
this case, the correspondent node simply places the mobile node’s home address – 
the only address it knows – in the IPv6 Destination Address field and places its own 
address in the IPv6 Source Address field. The correspondent node then forwards the 
packet to a suitable Next Hop, as determined by examining its IPv6 routing table. 
A packet sent in this way will be routed toward the mobile node’s home link in the 
same way as in Mobile IPv4. There, the home agent will intercept the packet and 
tunnel it to the care-of address. The mobile node decapsulates the packet sees that the 
inner packet is destined to its home address, and passes the inner packet up to the 
higher-layer protocol. 
So far, it is identical to packet routing in Mobile IPv4. However, in Mobile IPv6, the 
mobile node interprets the presence of the tunnel to mean that the correspondent 
node does not know the mobile node’s current care-of address. Thus, if the mobile 
node can develop a security association with that correspondent node, then the 
mobile node might send a Binding Update to it, based upon its policy for sending 
Binding Updates. Once this occurs, the correspondent node can then send packets 
directly to the mobile node [6]. 
2.5.4.3 Packets sending process of mobile node 
When a mobile node is connected to a foreign link, it must have a way to determine a 
router that can forward packets generated by the mobile node. This is easier in 
Mobile IPv6 than it was in Mobile IPv4, because all IPv6 routers are required to 
implement Router Discovery. Thus, a mobile node can select any router on the 
foreign link from which it has received Router Advertisements. The mobile node 
configures its routing table such that all packets it generates are sent to this router. 
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2.6 Main Differences between Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 
Both the experiences gained from the development of Mobile IP support in IPv4 
(Mobile IPv4) and the opportunities provided by IPv6, affect the design of Mobile IP 
support in IPv6 (Mobile IPv6). Mobile IPv6 thus shares many features with Mobile 
IPv4, but is integrated into IPv6 and offers many other improvements. This section 
summarizes the major differences between Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6: 
 There is no need to deploy special routers as "foreign agents", as in Mobile 
IPv4. Mobile IPv6 operates in any location without any special support 
required from the local router. 
 Support for route optimization is a fundamental part of the protocol, rather 
than a nonstandard set of extensions. 
 Mobile IPv6 route optimization can operate securely even without pre-
arranged security associations. It is expected that route optimization can be 
deployed on a global scale between all mobile nodes and correspondent 
nodes. 
 Support is also integrated into Mobile IPv6 for allowing route optimization to 
coexist efficiently with routers that perform "ingress filtering"  
 The IPv6 Neighbor Unreachability Detection assures symmetric reachability 
between the mobile node and its default router in the current location. 
 Most packets sent to a mobile node while away from home in Mobile IPv6 
are sent using an IPv6 routing header rather than IP encapsulation, reducing 
the amount of resulting overhead compared to Mobile IPv4. 
 Mobile IPv6 is decoupled from any particular link layer, as it uses IPv6 
Neighbor Discovery [20] instead of ARP. This also improves the robustness 
of the protocol. 
 The use of IPv6 encapsulation (and the routing header) removes the need in 
Mobile IPv6 to manage "tunnel soft state". 
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 The dynamic home agent address discovery mechanism in Mobile IPv6 
returns a single reply to the mobile node. The directed broadcast approach 
used in IPv4 returns separate replies from each home agent. 
Other documents related with mobility are in [32-53]. 
 52 
3.  SECURITY 
In this chapter, it is given an introduction to computer and network security. When 
computer scientists and network managers talk about security, they are generally 
referring to the science of protecting computers, network resources, and information 
against unauthorized access, modification, and destruction. This generally involves 
four related topics, the definition of which has been paraphrased from Security 
Architecture for the Internet Protocol [54]: 
 Confidentiality – transforming data such that only authorized parties can 
decode it. 
 Authentication – proving or disproving someone’s or something’s claimed 
identity. 
 Integrity checking – ensuring that data cannot be modified without such 
modification being detectable. 
 Non-repudiation – proving that a source of some data did in fact send data 
that he might later deny sending. 
Broadly speaking, technology employed to accomplish all of these security features 
is called cryptography [6]. 
This chapter is presented in few sections. First, cryptology is explained basically. 
Then, some of security protocols are presented. Next, some security threads in a 
mobile system are shown. And then, origin of security problems of Mobile IP is 
presented. Finally, some existing security solutions are shown.  
3.1 Cryptography 
A cryptographic system consists of two fundamental components: a complicated 
mathematical function, called an algorithm, and one or more secret or public values, 
called keys. A key is a chunk of binary data that is (supposed to be) known only to 
the parties, which wish to communicate securely. In contrast, an algorithm is usually 
published and is available to anyone who wants to read it. This state of affairs is 
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fortunate, because it is relatively easy to generate a new chunk of binary data (a key) 
but difficult to devise new cryptographic algorithms. 
A strong cryptographic algorithm is one that has withstood the attempts of really 
smart mathematicians to break it. An algorithm is said to be broken when someone 
figures out a weakness or a flaw that can be exploited by Bad Guys to do bad things. 
When an algorithm is broken to the point at which it can be easily defeated, then it 
ceases to be useful. Algorithms are considered to be good ones when many smart 
people have tried to break them, over long period of time, without being successful. 
A good key is one that is known only to the appropriate person, is not easily 
guessable, and is sufficiently long. Specifically, a key should be long enough to 
withstand brute-force attacks in which a Bad Guy simply tries every possible key 
until he finds the right one. A cryptographic system is not considered to be secure 
unless it uses a strong algorithm [8]. 
3.2 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPSec) 
IPSec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality, cryptographically based 
security for IPv4 and IPv6. The set of security services offered includes access 
control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, replay protection (a form 
of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption) and limited traffic flow 
confidentiality. These services are provided at the IP layer, offering protection for IP 
and/or upper layer protocols. 
These objectives are met through the use of two traffic security protocols, the 
Authentication Header (AH) and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and 
through the use of cryptographic key management procedures and protocols. The set 
of IPSec protocols employed in any context, and the ways in which they are 
employed, will be determined by the security and system requirements of users, 
applications, and/or sites/organizations. 
When these mechanisms are correctly implemented and deployed, they ought not to 
adversely affect users, hosts, and other Internet components that do not employ these 
security mechanisms for protection of their traffic. These mechanisms also are 
designed to be algorithm-independent. This modularity permits selection of different 
sets of algorithms without affecting the other parts of the implementation. For 
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example, different user communities may select different sets of algorithms (creating 
cliques) if required. 
A standard set of default algorithms is specified to facilitate interoperability in the 
global Internet. The use of these algorithms, in conjunction with IPSec traffic 
protection and key management protocols, is intended to permit system and 
application developers to deploy high quality, Internet layer, cryptographic security 
technology [54]. 
3.2.1 The roles of IPSec 
IPSec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select 
required security protocols, determine the algorithms to use for the services, and put 
in place any cryptographic keys required to provide the requested services. IPSec can 
be used to protect one or more "paths" between a pair of hosts, between a pair of 
security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. (The term "security 
gateway" is used throughout the IPSec documents to refer to an intermediate system 
that system implements IPSec protocols. For example, a router or a firewall 
implementing IPSec is a security gateway.) 
The set of security services that IPSec can provide includes access control, 
connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, replayed packets rejection (a 
form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic 
flow confidentiality. Because these services are provided at the IP layer, they can be 
used by any higher layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc [6,8,54]. 
3.2.2 IPSec working principles 
IPSec uses two protocols to provide traffic security - AH and ESP. Both protocols 
are described in more detail in their respective RFCs [24,25]. 
 The AH [24] provides connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, 
and an optional anti-replay service. 
 The ESP protocol [25] may provide confidentiality (encryption), and limited 
traffic flow confidentiality. It also may provide connectionless integrity, data 
origin authentication, and an anti-replay service. (One or the other set of these 
security services must be applied whenever ESP is invoked.) 
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 Both AH and ESP are vehicles for access control, based on the distribution of 
cryptographic keys and the management of traffic flows relative to these 
security protocols. 
These protocols may be applied alone or in combination with each other to provide a 
desired set of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. Each protocol supports two modes 
of use: transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport mode the protocols provide 
protection primarily for upper layer protocols; in tunnel mode, the protocols are 
applied to tunneled IP packets [54]. 
3.2.3 Security associations (SA) 
A Security Association (SA) is a simplex "connection" that affords security services 
to the traffic carried by it. Security services are afforded to an SA by the use of AH, 
or ESP, but not both. If both AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, 
then two (or more) SAs are created to afford protection to the traffic stream. To 
secure typical, bi-directional communication between two hosts, or between two 
security gateways, two SAs (one in each direction) are required. 
An SA is uniquely identified by a triple consisting of a Security Parameter Index 
(SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. In 
principle, the Destination Address may be a unicast address; an IP broadcast address, 
or a multicast group address. However, IPSec SA management mechanisms currently 
are defined only for unicast SAs. Hence, in the discussions that follow, SAs will be 
described in the context of point-to-point communication, even though the concept is 
applicable in the point-to-multipoint case as well. 
Two types of SAs are defined: transport mode and tunnel mode. A transport mode 
SA is a security association between two hosts. In IPv4, a transport mode security 
protocol header appears immediately after the IP header and any options, and before 
any higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP or UDP). In IPv6, the security protocol header 
appears after the base IP header and extensions, but may appear before or after 
destination options, and before higher layer protocols. In the case of ESP, a transport 
mode SA provides security services only for these higher layer protocols, not for the 
IP header or any extension headers preceding the ESP header. In the case of AH, the 
protection is also extended to selected portions of the IP header, selected portions of 
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extension headers, and selected options (contained in the IPv4 header, IPv6 Hop-by-
Hop extension header, or IPv6 Destination extension headers). 
A tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an IP tunnel. Whenever either end 
of a security association is a security gateway, the SA must be tunnel mode. Thus an 
SA between two security gateways is always a tunnel mode SA, as is an SA between 
a host and a security gateway. Note that for the case where traffic is destined for a 
security gateway, e.g., SNMP commands, the security gateway is acting as a host and 
transport mode is allowed. But in that case, the security gateway is not acting as a 
gateway, i.e., not transiting traffic. Two hosts may establish a tunnel mode SA 
between themselves. The requirement for any (transit traffic) SA involving a security 
gateway to be a tunnel SA arises due to the need to avoid potential problems with 
regard to fragmentation and reassembly of IPSec packets, and in circumstances 
where multiple paths (e.g., via different security gateways) exist to the same 
destination behind the security gateways. 
For a tunnel mode SA, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies the IPSec 
processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header that specifies the (apparently) 
ultimate destination for the packet. The security protocol header appears after the 
outer IP header, and before the inner IP header. If AH is employed in tunnel mode, 
portions of the outer IP header are afforded protection (as above), as well as the 
entire tunneled IP packet (i.e., all of the inner IP header is protected, as well as 
higher layer protocols). If ESP is employed, the protection is afforded only to the 
tunneled packet, onto the outer header [54]. 
3.3 IP Authentication Header (AH) 
The AH is used to provide connectionless integrity and data origin authentication for 
IP datagram, and to provide protection against replays. Latter this, optional service 
may be selected, by the receiver, when an SA is established. (Although the default 
calls for the sender to increment the Sequence Number used for anti-replay, the 
service is effective only if the receiver checks the Sequence Number.) AH provides 
authentication for as much of the IP header as possible, as well as for upper level 
protocol data. However, some IP header fields may change in transit and the value of 
these fields, when the packet arrives at the receiver, may not be predictable by the 
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sender. The values of such fields cannot be protected by AH. Thus the protection 
provided to the IP header by AH is somewhat piecemeal [24]. 
3.4 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) 
The ESP header is designed to provide a mix of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. 
ESP may be applied alone, in combination with the IP Authentication Header [24], or 
in a nested fashion, e.g., through the use of tunnel mode [54]. Security services can 
be provided between a pair of communicating hosts, between a pair of 
communicating security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. 
The ESP header is inserted after the IP header and before the upper layer protocol 
header (transport mode) or before an encapsulated IP header (tunnel mode). 
ESP is used to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless 
integrity, an anti-replay service (a form of partial sequence integrity), and limited 
traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services provided depends on options selected 
at the time of SA establishment and on the placement of the implementation. 
Confidentiality may be selected independent of all other services. However, use of 
confidentiality without integrity/authentication (either in ESP or separately in AH) 
may subject traffic to certain forms of active attacks that could undermine the 
confidentiality service. Data origin authentication and connectionless integrity are 
joint services and are offered as an option in conjunction with confidentiality. The 
anti-replay service may be selected only if data origin authentication is selected, and 
its election is solely at the discretion of the receiver. (Although the default calls for 
the sender to increment the Sequence Number used for anti-replay, the service is 
effective only if the receiver checks the Sequence Number.) Traffic flow 
confidentiality requires selection of tunnel mode, and is most effective if 
implemented at a security gateway, where traffic aggregation may be able to mask 
true source-destination patterns. Note that although both confidentiality and 
authentication are optional, at least one of them must be selected [25]. 
3.5 Other Security Protocols 
There are many other security protocols used in the Internet. It is mentioned some of 
them below: 
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 Secure SHell (SSH) and Secure CoPy (SCP) provide secure remote login, 
command execution, and file transfer in the Unix. 
 SOCK provides a general mechanism for secure, application-layer, firewall 
traversal. 
 The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and the Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol 
(S-HTTP) are frequently used to provide confidentiality and authentication 
for the World Wide Web (WWW) and for other applications. 
3.6 Key Distribution 
A cryptographic system is considered to be secure only if it uses a strong algorithm, 
avoids certain pitfalls, and chooses and distributes keys carefully. A well-chosen key 
is one that is not easy guessable and is sufficiently long. A well-managed key is one 
that is known only to the appropriate person. The challenge of key management is to 
make sure that no one other than the intended person can obtain the appropriate keys, 
particularly when keys must be distributed to various individuals over a network. 
Specifically: 
 If two parties wish to communicate securely using secret-key cryptology [8], 
then only those two parties are able to obtain a copy of their shared, secret 
key. 
 If two parties wish to communicate securely using public-key cryptography 
[8], then each individual is able to obtain the other person’s public key 
authentically; i.e., each is able to determine that they have indeed obtained 
the other person’s public key and not one substituted by a Bad Guy. 
Key management in secret-key cryptography is extremely difficult to do securely. 
However, if it can be figured out a way to manage public keys securely, then it can 
be always encrypted a secret key using a public-key encryption algorithm before 
sending it over the network. Thus, if it can be solved the easier problem of 
distributing public keys securely, then it can be also solved the harder problem of 
distributing secret keys securely [6]. 
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3.7 Some Security Threats in a Mobile System 
There are lots of security threats in a mobile system. However, only three of them are 
explained in this section. 
3.7.1 A denial-of service attack 
Generally speaking, a denial-of service attack is something that a Bad Guy does in 
order to prevent someone from getting useful work done. In the context of computer 
networking, a denial-of service attack usually takes one of the following forms: 
 By sending a tremendous number of packets to a host (e.g., a Web server), a 
Bad Guy can make the host’s CPU processing too many useless packets. In 
the meantime, no useful information can be exchanged with the host while it 
processing the entire nuisance. 
 A Bad Guy somehow interferes with the packets that are flowing between 
two nodes on the network. Generally speaking, a Bad Guy must be on the 
path between the two nodes in order wreak any such havoc [6]. 
In the first form attack, a popular method using spoofed Source IP Address send 
many TCP connection setup requests to bombard target host is known as “TCP SYN 
Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks”. One reason of making spoofing possible is the 
fact that the IP unicast packet routing depends only on IP Destination Address 
without the need of the IP Source Address. This allows the attacker to spoof the IP 
Source Address while still being able to bombard the host with TCP connection 
requests. 
In the second form of denial-of service attack, a Bad Guy generally, need be on the 
path between two corresponding hosts in order cut off their traffic flow completely. 
But in the case of Mobile IP, a Bad Guy can wage the denial-of service attack from 
anywhere in the network. As it is known, if a mobile node is connected on the 
foreign link, it must use registration to inform its home agent of its current care-of 
address to which the home agent will subsequently tunnel all packets destined to the 
mobile node’s home address. So a Bad Guy can send a bogus registration request 
message specifying his own IP Address as the care-of address for a mobile node to 
the home agent. Thus, all packets sent by correspondent nodes will be tunneled to the 
Bad Guy while the mobile node cannot get deserved services [55]. 
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3.7.2 Replay attack 
The Mobile-Home Authentication Extension prevents the denial-of service attack 
described above. However, it is not enough by itself, because a Bad Guy could obtain 
a copy of a valid Registration Request, store it, and then “reply” it at a later time, 
thereby registering a bogus care-of address for the mobile node. To prevent this reply 
attack from happening, the mobile node generates a unique value of the Identification 
field in each successive attempted registration. The Identification field is generated 
in such a way as to allow the home agent to determine what the next value should be. 
In this way, the Bad Guy is thwarted because the home agent will recognize the 
Identification field in its stored Registration Request as being out-of-date. 
Mobile IP specifies two ways in which the Identification field can be chosen in order 
to prevent these reply attacks. The first uses timestamps, wherein the mobile node 
uses its current estimate for the date-and-time-of-day in the Identification field. If 
this estimate is not sufficiently close to the home agent’s estimate of the current time, 
then it rejects the mobile node’s registration and at the same time provides the 
mobile node with enough information to synchronize its clock to the home agent’s 
clock. Then, any future Identification values generated by the mobile node will be 
within the home agent’s tolerance [6]. 
The other method uses random number named as nonces. In this method, the mobile 
node and the home agent specify the value placed in the Identification field 
accordingly. If either node receives a registration message in which the Identification 
field does not match the expected value, then the message is rejected in the case of 
the home agent or ignored in the case of mobile node. Also, using the latter method, 
a mobile node can synchronize to the home agent [55]. 
3.7.3 Theft of information attack 
A serious threat faced by the mobile node on the network is theft of information. 
Generally speaking, this kind of attack can take one of the following two methods: 
 Passive Eavesdropping: As it is known, the physical security is seldom 
perfect and unauthorized people are often unintentionally allowed to access 
the network. It should be noted that wireless links can provide a serious 
vulnerability, in that someone need not physically be connected to the 
network to gain access to the information being sent across the link. 
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 Session-Stealing Attack: A session-stealing attack is one in which a baddy 
waits for a legitimate node to authenticate itself and start an application 
session, then takes over the session by impersonating the identity of the 
legitimate node. The baddy firstly wait for a mobile node to register with its 
home agent and eavesdrop to see if the date being sent is valuable to him. 
Then he floods the mobile node with nuisance packets while stealing the 
session by sourcing packets that appear to have come from the mobile node 
and by intercepting packets destinated to the mobile node. In the meantime, 
the user of the mobile node might has no idea that his session has been 
hijacked because there is no indication showing like this has occurred. 
3.8 Some Security Solutions for Mobile IP 
In this section, three types of security solutions for Mobile IP are presented. First of 
them is security solution using Virtual Private Network. Second, security solution 
using Firewall is presented. And last, security solution using Authentication, 
Authorization, Accounting (AAA) Servers is described. 
3.8.1 Security solution using virtual private network (VPN) 
3.8.1.1 Mobile IPv4 home agents inside the Intranet behind a VPN gateway 
Mobile IPv4 home agents are deployed inside the Intranet protected by a VPN 
gateway, and is not directly reachable by the mobile nodes outside the Intranet. 
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of this scenario. 
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Figure 3.1. Mobile IPv4 home agents inside the Intranet behind a VPN gateway 
Direct application of Mobile IPv4 standards [26] is successfully used to provide 
mobility for users inside the Intranet. However, mobile users outside the Intranet can 
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only access the intranet resources (e.g., Mobile IP agents) through the VPN Gateway, 
which will allow only authenticated IPSec traffic inside. This implies that the Mobile 
IPv4 traffic has to run inside IPSec, which leads to two distinct problems: 
 When the foreign network has a foreign agent deployed, Mobile IPv4 
registration becomes impossible because the traffic between mobile node and 
VPN Gateway, which the foreign agent sees, is encrypted and the foreign 
agent is not set up to decrypt it. 
 In co-located mode, successful registration is possible but the VPN tunnel has 
to be re-negotiated every time the mobile node changes its point of network 
attachment. 
This deployment scenario may not be common yet, but it is practical and becoming 
important as there is an increasing need for providing corporate remote users with 
continuous access to the Intranet resources [56]. 
3.8.1.2 VPN gateway and Mobile IPv4 home agents in parallel 
A Mobile IPv4 home agent is deployed in parallel with the VPN gateway, and it is 
directly reachable by mobile nodes inside or outside the Intranet. Figure 3.2 shows 
the architecture of this scenario. 
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Figure 3.2. VPN gateway and Mobile IPv4 home agents in parallel 
The Mobile IPv4 home agent has a public interface connected to the Internet, and a 
private interface attached to the Intranet. Mobile users will most likely have a virtual 
home network associated with the Mobile IPv4 home agent's private interface, so that 
the mobile users are always away from home and hence registered with the Mobile 
IPv4 home agent. Furthermore, in deployments where the VPN Gateway and the 
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home agent are placed in a corporate DMZ, this implies that Mobile IPv4 traffic will 
always be routed through the DMZ (regardless of whether mobile nodes are located 
outside or inside the Intranet), which may not be acceptable by IT departments in 
large corporations. 
This deployment can be used with two different configurations: "Mobile IPv4 inside 
IPSec-ESP tunnel" and "IPSec-ESP inside Mobile IPv4 tunnel". The "Mobile IPv4 
inside IPSec-ESP tunnel" has the same problems as the scenario of Section 3.8.1.1. 
The "IPSec-ESP inside Mobile IPv4 tunnel" does not have problems described in 
Section 3.8.1.1, however it will require some modifications to the routing logic of the 
Mobile IPv4 home agent or the VPN Gateway [56]. 
3.8.1.3 Combined VPN gateway and Mobile IPv4 home agent 
This is similar to deployment scenario described in Section 3.8.1.2., with the 
exception that the VPN Gateway and Mobile IPv4 home agent are running on the 
same physical machine. Figure 3.3 shows the architecture of this scenario. 
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Figure 3.3. Combined VPN gateway and Mobile IPv4 home agent 
Running Mobile IPv4 home agent and VPN on the same machine resolves routing 
related issues that exist in Section 3.8.1.2 when an "IPSec-ESP inside Mobile IPv4 
tunnel" configuration is used. However, it does not promote multi-vendor 
interoperability in environments where Mobile IPv4 home agent and VPN 
technologies must be acquired from different vendors [56]. 
3.8.1.4 Mobile IPv4 home agents outside the VPN domain 
In this scenario, Mobile IPv4 home agents are deployed outside the Intranet (e.g., in 
an operator network), as depicted in Figure 3.4 below. 
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Figure 3.4. Mobile IPv4 home agents outside the VPN domain 
This deployment works today without any technical problems with IPSec-ESP 
running inside a Mobile IPv4 tunnel. And it has the same problems as in Section 
3.8.1.3 if Mobile IPv4 is run inside the IPSec-ESP tunnel. This is not common or 
practical for large deployments (on the order of thousands of users) because of the 
large and distributed security perimeter [56]. 
3.8.2 Security solution using firewall 
A firewall is a device or a set of devices, which separates a trusted, private network 
from an untrusted, public network such as the Internet. A firewall protects a private 
network from intrusion by Bad Guys but it should not prevent people on the inside 
from exchanging information with others on the public network. The basic 
architecture of a firewall is shown in Figure 3.5. It is described two types of firewalls 
in this section. 
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Figure 3.5. Basic architecture of a firewall 
3.8.2.1 Packet-filtering router 
Packet filtering router determines whether or not to forward a given packet by 
looking at the packet’s header fields. Based upon these header fields the packet is 
classified according to a set of rules that are part of the router’s configuration. These 
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rules specify whether certain packets may be forwarded or whether they must be 
discarded. Rules are also known as Access Control List (ACL). Packets that are 
discarded because of an ACL are said to filter or screened. Packet-Filtering Router is 
shown in Figure 3.6. 
Public  Network Private Network
Bad Guy
Packet-Filtering Router
 
Figure 3.6. Packet-filtering router as firewall 
Packet-filtering routers are attractive because they are fast and because they are 
largely independent of applications. They are fast because they perform relatively 
simple processing. They are independent of applications because they do not have to 
be upgraded or replaced when a new application comes along. This is in contrast to 
application-layer relays. Finally, packet-filtering routers can be an inexpensive 
solution because most private networks already have a router of some sort, which 
they use to connect to the Internet. 
The problem with packet-filtering firewalls is that they are extremely difficult to 
configure correctly. ACLs must frequently be written in an obscure syntax without 
the help of graphical user interfaces. Any mistake in an ACL can leave the private 
network vulnerable to attack by a Bad Guy. Often, there is no way to verify that a set 
of ACLs is correct until it is too late. 
There are other problems with packet-filtering routers. Because they are by definition 
routers, the IP address of the machines in the private network are visible to the public 
network, making those machines more vulnerable to attack than they might 
otherwise be. Also, a good security system has the ability to log suspect activity, and 
routers generally have little or no disk space on which to record such events. Finally, 
they do not support certain security policies, such as requiring users to be 
authenticated before being allowed to communicate outside the firewall [6]. 
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3.8.2.2 Application-layer relay 
A configuration involving an application-layer relay is shown in Figure 3.7.  
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Figure 3.7. Application-layer relay as firewall 
A host in a private network sets up a connection to the firewall and sends 
application-layer data to the firewall. The firewall then relays this application-layer 
data over a new connection that it sets up to the ultimate destination host. The two 
routers in the figure are configuring with ACLs, which allow packets only to and 
from the relay host. Specifically, the routers do not allow any packets to flow directly 
between the private network and the public network. 
Application-layer relay are able to enforce more sophisticated security policies 
because they understand not only packet headers but also the applications 
themselves. In addition, they are often easier to configure and they are able to hide 
from the public network the address of nodes within the private network. Because 
they can be built with plenty of disk capacity, they have the ability to provide full 
auditing and logging capability. 
Application-layer relays are normally slower than packet-filtering routers, however, 
simply because they have much more work to do. Specifically, application-layer 
relays must process packets at all of the protocol layers and might have many TCP 
connections open at any given time. Also, by definition, an application-layer relay 
must specifically support an application before it can be used across the firewall. 
Typically, new applications are available to users well before the firewall catches up 
and is able to relay the associated traffic. An application-layer relay is thus “visible” 
to end users, who either must have firewall-aware applications or must modify their 
behavior in order to use their existing applications. 
 67 
Another problem with application-layer relay is that they prevent even legitimate 
mobile users from enjoying the same connectivity they enjoy when connected to the 
private network. This because some applications that are in use in private network 
might not be supported by the firewall and possibly because the firewall does not 
work symmetrically in both directions [6]. 
3.8.3 Security solution using authentication, authorization, accounting (AAA) 
servers  
3.8.3.1 Basic model of an AAA 
In this section, it is attempt to capture the main features of a basic model for 
operation of AAA servers that seems to have good support within the Mobile IP 
working group. Within the Internet, a client belonging to one administrative domain 
(called the home domain) often needs to use resources provided by another 
administrative domain (called the foreign domain). An agent in the foreign domain 
that attends to the client's request (call the agent the "attendant") is likely to require 
that the client provide some credentials that can be authenticated before access to the 
resources is permitted. These credentials may be something the foreign domain 
understands, but in most cases they are assigned by, and understood only by the 
home domain, and may be used for setting up secure channels with the mobile node. 
AAAL
AttendantClient
AAAH
Local Domain
Home Domain
AAAL : local authority
AAAH : home authority
 
Figure 3.8. AAA servers in home and local domains 
The attendant often does not have direct access to the data needed to complete the 
transaction. Instead, the attendant is expected to consult an authority (typically in the 
same foreign domain) in order to request proof that the client has acceptable 
credentials. Since the attendant and the local authority are part of the same 
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administrative domain, they are expected to have established, or be able to establish 
for the necessary lifetime, a secure channel for the purposes of exchanging sensitive 
(access) information, and keeping it private from (at least) the visiting mobile node. 
The local authority (AAAL) itself may not have enough information stored locally to 
carry out the verification for the credentials of the client. In contrast to the attendant, 
however, the AAAL is expected to configure with enough information to negotiate 
the verification of client credentials with external authorities. The local and the 
external authorities should be configured with sufficient security relationships and 
access controls so that they, possibly without the need for any other AAA agents, can 
negotiate the authorization that may enable the client to have access to any/all 
requested resources. In many typical cases, the authorization depends only upon 
secure authentication of the client's credentials. 
Once the local authority has obtained the authorization, and the authority has notified 
the attendant about the successful negotiation, the attendant can provide the 
requested resources to the client. 
In Figure 3.8., there might be many attendants for each AAAL, and there might be 
many clients from many different Home Domains. Each Home Domain provides an 
AAAH that can check credentials originating from clients administered by that Home 
Domain. 
There is a security model implicit in the above figure, and it is crucial to identify the 
specific security associations assumed in the security model. 
First, it is natural to assume that the client has a security association with the AAAH, 
since that is roughly what it means for the client to belong to the home domain. 
Second, from the model illustrated in Figure 3.8 it is clear that AAAL and AAAH 
have to share a security association, because otherwise they could not rely on the 
authentication results, authorizations, nor even the accounting data, which might be 
transacted between them. Requiring such bilateral security relationships is, however, 
in the end not scalable; the AAA framework must provide for more scalable 
mechanisms. 
Finally, in Figure 3.8., it is clear that the attendant can naturally share an SA with the 
AAAL. This is necessary in order for the model to work because the attendant has to 
know that it is permissible to allocate the local resources to the client [57]. 
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3.8.4 AAA for Mobile IP 
Clients using Mobile IP require specific features from the AAA services, in addition 
to the requirements already mentioned in [57] connection with the basic AAA 
functionality and what is needed for IP connectivity. To understand the application of 
the general model for Mobile IP, it is considered the mobile node to be the client in 
Figure 3.8, and the attendant to be the foreign agent. If a situation arises that there is 
no foreign agent present, e.g., in the case of an IPv4 mobile node with a collocated 
care-of address or an IPv6 mobile node, the equivalent attendant functionality is to 
be provided by the address allocation entity, e.g., a DHCP server. The home agent, 
while important to Mobile IP, is allowed to play a role during the initial registration 
that is subordinate to the role played by the AAAH. For application to Mobile IP, it 
is modified the general model as illustrated in Figure 3.9. After the initial 
registration, the mobile node is authorized to continue using Mobile IP at the foreign 
domain without requiring further involvement by the AAA servers. Thus, the initial 
registration will probably take longer than subsequent Mobile IP registrations. 
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Figure 3.9. AAA servers with Mobile IP agents 
In order to reduce this extra time overhead as much as possible, it is important to 
reduce the time taken for communications between the AAA servers. A major 
component of this communications latency is the time taken to traverse the wide-area 
Internet that is likely to separate the AAAL and the AAAH. This leads to a further 
strong motivation for integration of the AAA functions themselves, as well as 
integration of AAA functions with the initial Mobile IP registration. In order to 
reduce the number of messages that traverse the network for initial registration of a 
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mobile node, the AAA functions in the visited network (AAAL) and the home 
network (AAAH) need to interface with the foreign agent and the home agent to 
handle the registration message. Latency would be reduced as a result of initial 
registration being handled in conjunction with AAA and the Mobile IP mobility 
agents. Subsequent registrations, however, would be handled according to [6,26]. 
Another way to reduce latency as to accounting would be the exchange of small 
records. 
As there are many different types of sub-services attendants may provide to mobile 
clients, there must be extensible accounting formats. In this way, the specific services 
being provided can be identified, as well as accounting support should more services 
be identified in the future. 
The AAA home domain and the home agent home domain of the mobile node need 
not be part of the same administrative domain. Such a situation can occur if the home 
address of the mobile node is provided by one domain, e.g., an ISP that the mobile 
user uses while at home, and the authorization and accounting by another 
(specialized) domain, e.g., a credit card company. The foreign agent sends only the 
authentication information of the mobile node to the AAAL, which interfaces to the 
AAAH. After a successful authorization of the mobile node, the foreign agent is able 
to continue with the mobile IP registration procedure. Such a scheme introduces 
more delay if the access to the AAA functionality and the mobile IP protocol is 
sequentialized. Subsequent registrations would be handled according to [26] without 
further interaction with the AAA. Whether to combine or separate the Mobile IP 
protocol data with/from the AAA messages is ultimately a policy decision. 
Separation of the Mobile IP protocol data and the AAA messages can be successfully 
accomplished only if the IP address of the mobile node's home agent is provided to 
the foreign agent performing the attendant function. 
All needed AAA and Mobile IP functions should be processed during a single 
Internet traversal. This must be done without requiring AAA servers to process 
protocol messages sent to Mobile IP agents. The AAA servers must identify the 
Mobile IP agents and SAs necessary to process the Mobile IP registration, pass the 
necessary registration data to those Mobile IP agents, and remain uninvolved in the 
routing and authentication processing steps particular to Mobile IP registration [57]. 
Other documents related with security are in [58-78]. 
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4.  A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF MOBILE IPv4 TRAVERSING 
IPSEC BASED VPN GATEWAY 
In this chapter, a new architecture is proposed, which the architecture enables 
seemless secure mobility when a mobile node traverses an IPSec based VPN 
Gateway. At first, related works on secure mobility in literature are overviewed. 
After this, components of the proposed architecture, the basic topology of the 
architecture and scenarios according to the position of a mobile node are given in 
sequence. Consequently, analysis of the new architecture is done according to 
experiments and analytical approach. 
4.1 Related Works 
T. Braun and M. Danzeisen describe a solution called Secure Mobile IP (SecMIP) to 
provide Mobile IP users secure access to their company’s firewall protected VPN 
[74]. The organization’s interior network is isolated from the Internet by a DMZ. The 
firewall between the DMZ and private interior network is the only entry point to the 
organization’s private network. When the mobile node changes its care-of address, 
the mobile node dissolves the old IPSec tunnel and establishes a new IPSec tunnel 
according to the new care-of address. This solution needs dynamic SA support. 
J. P. Aspas and F. B. Arroyo presented the design of a VPN supporting user mobility 
[69]. The VPN has two parts: the access network and the public Internet to connect 
to the corporate Intranet. The access network can be based on GPRS or a WLAN 
network. The system uses the security provided by the access network and IPSec in 
the public Internet. The mobility of the terminal is supported by the use of Mobile IP. 
Mobile nodes require dynamic set-up and tearing down of tunnels between various 
gateways on the basis of each user’s current point-of attachment. Again, these 
dynamic set up of tunnels need dynamic SA support. 
Y. Tsuda, et al described an implementation example of a system, “Network Crypto 
Gate (NCG)” [70], which employs the Mobile IPv4 and IPSec on stationary security 
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gateways (NCG servers) and mobile hosts (NCG clients). Using IP security 
primitives, both packets going into a corporate network and packets going out of the 
visiting network are securely guarded, however, it does not promote multi-vendor 
interoperability [57]. 
L. Morand and S. Tessier described a global mobility approach with Mobile IP in all 
IP networks [45]. They describe how the EURESCOM project P1013 FIT-MIP 
evaluates the use of Mobile IP in an IP core network, acting as a mobility 
management protocol federating heterogeneous access network technologies such as 
PSTN, WLAN or GPRS. The aim is to provide a wide IP environment with an 
always-on access to IP applications (Voice over IP, VPN, mobile Internet, etc.), 
Mobile IP functionalities enabling seemless mobility through the various networks. 
However, this architecture is only related with accessing to IP environments. It does 
not solve secure roaming between the Internet and the Intranet.  
In contrast to these solutions, the new architecture enables seemless secure mobility 
between the Internet and the Intranet without any problem. 
4.2 Components of the Proposed Architecture 
The proposed architecture contains mainly five components, which are listed as 
Mobile Node (MN), Intranet Home Agent (aHA), Internet Home Agent (eHA), 
Foreign Agent and IPSec based VPN Gateway. The Foreign Agent and the VPN 
Gateway are same as described in the standard protocols. Therefore, they are not 
explained in this section. 
4.2.1 Mobile node (MN) 
The properties of the MN are as follows: 
 The MN supports both Mobile IPv4 and IPSec. 
 The MN operates in two modes, namely normal mode and secure mode. The 
MN supports functions defined in the standard Mobile IPv4 when it operates 
in normal mode. However, when operating in secure mode, it has additional 
properties. For instance, the MN only sends and receives user IP packets 
tunneled with IPSec. 
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 The MN has a network detection mechanism to detect where it roams, in the 
Internet or in the Intranet (This is different from movement detection 
described in standard [26]). 
4.2.2 Intranet home agent (aHA) 
The properties of the aHA are as follows: 
 The aHA is located in the Intranet. 
 The aHA supports all functions defined in Mobile IPv4 standard [26]. 
 The aHA’s binding table contains information about modes of MNs that are 
registered to the aHA and the eHA. 
 The aHA informs the eHA about MNs registered to it. 
 The aHA is informed by the eHA about MNs registered to the eHA. 
 The aHA serves to MNs in the Intranet. 
 Also, the aHA serves to MNs which are in another network that can be 
accessed over an IPSec based VPN Gateway. 
 The aHA serves in two modes for a node, which are master (active) mode and 
slave (passive) mode. When the aHA is in master mode for an MN, the aHA 
is able to communicate (to make binding updates related with this MN) with 
the MN. Whereas, when the aHA is in passive mode, it does not exchange 
any binding update message with the MN. In slave mode, the aHA is only 
ready to serve for this MN when it moves to the Intranet. 
 When the aHA is in slave mode for an MN, it tunnels user IP packets to the 
eHA because it knows that the specified MN is in the Internet. 
 When the aHA is in active mode for an MN, the aHA tunnel the user 
messages directly to the MN’s care-of address (foreign agent care-of address 
or collocated care-of address). 
4.2.3 Internet home agent (eHA) 
The eHA is the new component in the proposed architecture. The properties of the 
eHA are as follows: 
 The eHA supports both Mobile IPv4 and IPSec protocols. 
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 The eHA’s binding table contains information about modes of MNs that are 
registered to the aHA and the eHA. 
 The eHA informs the aHA about MNs registered to it. 
 The eHA is informed by the aHA about MNs registered to the aHA. 
 The eHA serves to MNs in the Internet. 
 The eHA is able to establish an IPSec based VPN tunnel with the IPSec based 
VPN Gateway. 
 The eHA serves in two modes, which are master (active) mode and slave 
(passive) mode, for a node. When the eHA is in master mode for an MN, the 
eHA is able to communicate (to make binding updates related with this MN) 
with the MN. Whereas, when the eHA is in passive mode, it does not 
exchange any binding update message with the MN. In slave mode, the eHA 
is only ready to serve for this MN when it moves to the Internet. 
 When the eHA is in slave mode for an MN, the eHA is not responsible to 
affect any packet destined to the MN. The eHA is ready to serve to this MN 
as quickly as possible when the MN moves to the Internet. 
 When the eHA is in master mode for an MN, it is responsible to tunnel the 
user IP packets to the MN, which packets are tunneled by the aHA in a 
Mobile IPv4 tunnel and by the IPSec based VPN Gateway in an IPSec tunnel. 
4.3 The Basic Topology of the Proposed Architecture 
The basic topology of this architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. The basic topology of the proposed architecture 
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The eHA and the aHA communicate with each other to manage their binding tables 
related with an MN’s state. An MN can only communicate with either the aHA or the 
eHA at any specific time. HAs work as slave (passive) HAs or as master (active) 
HAs for an MN. The aHA and the eHA send their binding table to each other over 
the VPN Gateway to determine ultimate mode of an MN that MN is registered to 
these HAs. For security reason, the eHA must be able to establish an IPSec tunnel 
with the VPN Gateway in order to exchange information messages with the aHA to 
update its binding table securely. In contrast to the eHA, the aHA does not need to 
establish any tunnel with the VPN Gateway because it is assumed to be in a secure 
network. 
The MN can access any of HA at any time. When the MN is in the Intranet, it has to 
access to the aHA. But as soon as, it has left the Intranet, the eHA takes control. The 
aHA exchanges unencrypted data packets with the MN, but the eHA receives and 
sends only encrypted packets. Moreover, the eHA is not able to decrypt the packets 
destined to the MN. In contrast to data packets, Mobile IPv4 registration and update 
packets are exchanged as proposed in Mobile IPv4. 
MNs can use a collocated care-of address or a foreign agent care-of address when 
they are in a foreign network. If the MN uses a foreign agent care-of address, packets 
destined to the MN traverse an FA as proposed in [26]. The relationship between the 
MN and the aHA is the same as described in the Mobile IPv4 standard. This solution 
provides mobility for all IP packets in the Intranet and mobility for IPSec traffic in 
the Internet. If the security of Mobile IPv4 in the Internet is broken in this context, 
traffic redirection attacks on the IPSec traffic are possible. However, such routing 
attacks do not affect other IPSec properties, because IPSec does not consider the 
network between two IPSec endpoints to be secure in any way. 
When the MN traverses a VPN Gateway, it must be able to detect where it roams, 
because the MN has to know its location to maintain its communications securely. 
The MN sends plaintext packets in the Intranet, and ciphertext packets in the 
Internet. If the MN mistakenly believes that it is in the Intranet and sends plaintext 
packets although it is in the Internet, the IPSec security will be compromised 
undoubtedly. On the other hand, when the MN changes its network, the modes of the 
aHA and the eHA must be switched. For these reasons, the overall security, 
confidentiality and integrity of user data is a minimum of IPSec security and security 
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of the network detection mechanism. It is assumed in this thesis that on MN a 
network detection algorithm exists and works properly. 
The main advantage of this architecture is to provide seemless mobility both in the 
Internet and in the Intranet. Moreover, as physically the Internet and the Intranet are 
separated from each other, there cannot be any leak between these two networks. 
Additionally, this architecture has some advantages over Mobile IP Proxy [62]. It 
does not cause any problem to use different IP address for a VPN client and for a 
Mobile IP client because of secure communication of HAs. As a final advantage, the 
proposed architecture is eliminating unnecessary messaging as the status of an MN is 
known by the aHA and by the eHA at any specific time. 
4.4 Scenarios According to the Mobile Node 
4.4.1 Mobile node in the Intranet 
When the MN roams in the Intranet, mobility features are done as proposed in [26]. 
In this scenario, the MN uses the aHA as an HA to meet its requirements to roam in 
the Intranet. In addition to standard processes, the aHA informs the eHA about the 
MN’s state as it is mentioned in Section 4.3. Figure 4.2 shows user data packets flow 
for this scenario. 
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Figure 4.2. User data flow in the Intranet (triangle routing). 
4.4.2 Mobile node moves from the Intranet to the Internet 
In this scenario, the MN moves from the Intranet to the Internet traversing the VPN 
Gateway. When the MN changes its network, it needs to maintain its 
communications. To move from the Intranet to the Internet, the MN has to change its 
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active HA from the aHA to the eHA, and also its mode from the normal mode to the 
secure mode. Then, the MN can continue to communicate with the Correspondent 
Node (CN), without any interruption.  
When the MN is in the Intranet, the registration and the binding updates are done as 
described in Section 4.4.1. When the MN moves form the Intranet to the Internet, it 
has to detect network change immediately, and has to stop sending plaintext IP 
packets in the normal mode. 
4.4.3 Mobile node in the Internet 
When the MN is in the Internet, it uses extra features that come with the new 
architecture. Figure 4.3 shows user data flow of this scenario. 
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Figure 4.3. User data flow when the MN is in the Internet 
The registration and the binding update are accomplished between the MN and the 
eHA according to standard mechanisms. Furthermore, the eHA informs the aHA 
about the MN. Informing the aHA is achieved via an IPSec tunnel, that tunnel is 
established between the eHA and the VPN Gateway. After the registration process, 
the MN can exchange user data with a CN. 
The steps of user data flow are shown in Figure 4.3. First, the MN sends IP packets 
via an IPSec tunnel directly to the CN (denoted by 1 and 2 in Figure 4.3). The CN 
sends IP packets to the MN’s permanent address, and these IP packets are received 
by the aHA (3). The aHA knows that the MN is in the Internet. So, it tunnels these IP 
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packets to the VPN Gateway through a Mobile IPv4 tunnel (4). In the next step, the 
VPN Gateway tunnels IP packets via an IPSec tunnel to the MN’s permanent address 
(5). The eHA receives the tunneled IP packets and sends them through another 
Mobile IPv4 tunnel to the MN’s care-of address (6). Finally, the MN receives 
tunneled packets and decapsulates them from Mobile IPv4 and IPSec tunnels. 
4.4.4 Mobile node moves from the Internet to the Intranet 
When the MN moves from the Internet to the Intranet, it detects the network change. 
Afterwards, the MN changes its mode from the secure mode to the normal mode. It 
also has to register itself to aHA to roam in the Intranet. On the other hand, when the 
aHA receives a registration message from an MN, it checks its binding table to 
decide whether MN is a new one or MN comes from Internet. In this scenario, the 
aHA concludes that the MN comes from the Internet, and it changes its mode 
according to the MN. If the registration step is completed successfully, the MN can 
keep on its communications. 
4.4.5 Correspondent node as a mobile node 
In the previous four scenarios, it is assumed that the CN is in the Intranet. It contains 
confidential information, and it is not allowed to move. However, the CN can be an 
MN, whose permanent IP Address is in the Intranet. Therefore, flow steps of 
messages will change, according to the CN’s movement. In this case, packets 
destined to the CN are routed by the aHA as described in previous subsections. 
4.5 Analysis of the Proposed Architecture 
The new architecture is analyzed in three aspects: the IP packets size on path 
between a CN and an MN, overhead based on throughput and packet delay, and 
security. 
4.5.1 Analysis of the IP packet size 
In this section, IP packets analyses of the architecture are performed according to 
scenarios given in Section 4.4. At first, number of headers and their total size for 
paths from the aHA to the eHA, from the eHA to the aHA, from the MN to the CN 
and from the CN to the MN are calculated. Then, the increase or the decrease 
percentages of total headers are determined to find the header size characteristic and 
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number of headers characteristic. The total header size increase is defined as in 
Formula 4.1. 
HSI = (THS-SIPHS)/SIPHS                                                                                    (4.1) 
HSI = Header Size Increase  
THS = Total size of headers on a packet (byte) 
SIPHS = Standard IP Header Size (byte)  
The HSI is used to determine extra load that is based on headers on network links. 
In this thesis, the size of an IP header is assumed to be 20 bytes as a worst case 
(minimum value). The ESP header and the AH header sizes are assumed to be 10 and 
12 bytes, respectively, because authentication data and padding fields are variable 
due to cryptographic algorithms. 
Finally, all architecture is analyzed according to the results. 
Related documents with this type of measurements results are in [79-83]. 
4.5.1.1 Analysis of binding exchange messages 
In the new architecture, the aHA and the eHA construct their binding tables 
according to three different types of messages. These are normal registration 
messages, binding update messages and messages that come from the peer. User data 
flow and the HSI for this analysis are shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4. Messages between the eHA and the aHA 
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In this situation, the number of headers between the eHA and the VPN Gateway for 
both directions is higher than number of headers between the VPN Gateway and the 
aHA, as seen in Figure 4.4. The HSI values are different, which means that a packet 
on different parts of the paths consume different bandwidths because of extra headers 
as seen in Figure 4.4. As a result, the HSI values indicate that the bottleneck in this 
scenario can be between the eHA and the VPN Gateway. 
4.5.1.2 Analysis of the scenario in Section 4.4.1 
User data flow and the HSI values are given in Figure 4.5 for this scenario. 
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Figure 4.5. User data between the CN and the MN 
As it is presented in Figure 4.5, there is not any ESP and AH header between nodes. 
Most of HSI values are zero. Only header size of the messages sent by the aHA 
increase, due to the Mobile IP tunnel established from the aHA to the MN. Actually, 
when the MN is in the Intranet, there is not any additional header caused by the 
proposed architecture. Additional header only is caused by Mobile IP encapsulation 
in which IP in IP encapsulation is assumed to use. 
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4.5.1.3 Analysis of the scenario in Section 4.4.3 
This scenario is the main scenario to which the proposed architecture is claimed to be 
used for secure seemless mobility. User data flow and the HSI values for this 
scenario are given in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6. User data flow between the CN and the MN 
The HSI values for this scenario are generally greater than that of other scenarios. 
This means that bandwidth consumption of headers in some part of paths increases 
more than in all other parts. Furthermore, the HSI values vary between all 
components in system because the MN in the Internet uses Mobile IPv4, IPSec and 
properties that comes with the proposed architecture. Remarkably is that the 
bandwidth consumption of packets on the path from the CN to the MN is much 
greater than that on the path from the MN to the CN. This asymmetry might indicate 
that routing mechanism of Mobile IP has not been optimized yet. 
Consequently, the analyses show that the HSI value increases from the CN to the 
MN. The reason for this is related with the need for establishing both security and 
mobility features in the Internet. The derivative of the HSI on the path from the CN 
to the MN is greater than the derivative of the HSI on the path from the MN to the 
CN. Therefore, the bandwidth consumption of packets on the path from the CN to 
the MN is greater than that of reverse direction. This leads us to that optimal routing 
has not been achieved yet. The smallest value of the HSI in the Internet is measured 
as 2.1. This is the extra load on links that comes with security features of IPSec. On 
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the other hand, the cost of mobility is less than the amount for security in the 
Internet. In contrast to this, the extra load in the Intranet only stems from mobility. 
4.5.1.4 Analyses of other scenarios  
Since scenarios in Section 4.4.2 and in Section 4.4.4 are derived from scenarios in 
Section 4.4.1 and in Section 4.4.3, they give rise to similar results, and they are not 
analyzed again. Also, scenario in Section 4.4.5 is similar to scenario in Section 4.4.3. 
Therefore, it is not analyzed. 
4.5.2 Analysis of overhead 
Throughput and packet delay are used to demonstrate the overhead of the new 
architecture.  
To give an impression about the performance of the proposed architecture, a testpad, 
which is shown in Figure 4.7, was constructed. Then, some measurements were 
taken on the testpad to determine throughput values for specific cases. After this step, 
the results were analyzed. 
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Figure 4.7. Testpad for measuring throughput values 
The properties of the testpad are described below: 
 The testpad was established at TÜBİTAK-UEKAE IP Group laboratory. 
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 The aim is to give an idea about a possible overhead of IPSec on any system 
that uses IPSec properties to establish security. It was not planed to test either 
mobility or security properties on this testpad. 
 A hardware packet generator, SHOMITI hardware (Shomiti Systems Inc., 
San Jose, USA), was used to generate traffic with various rates. 
 A personnel computer on which SHOMITI Surveyor3.1 (Shomiti Systems 
Inc., San Jose, USA) software runs was used as a packet sniffer. 
 IPSec properties of the testpad were tested on Cisco2621 (Cisco Systems Inc., 
San Jose, USA) devices on which run c2600-ik903s3-mz.12z15T.bin ios. 
 A personnel computer on which management software of SHOMITI 
hardware packet generator run was used. 
 3Com-SuperStackII Switch 3300 12 Port 3C16981 (3Com Corporation, 350 
Campus Drive, Malborough, MA 01752-3064) switch was used to connect a 
Cisco2621 router, the packet generator, and management computer of the 
packet generator. 
 All links between devices were 10BaseT. Two devices were connected with a 
UTP (Unshielded Twisted Pair) cable. 
The test methods were prepared as follows: 
 Various rate of traffic (0.5 Mbps, 1Mbps, 2Mbps, 4Mbps, 8Mbps) were 
tested. 
 IP packets with different length (128 byte, 256 byte, 512 byte, 1024 byte) 
were generated. 
 Various IPSec configurations (AH-MD5 and ESP-DES-MD5) were tested on 
Cisco2621 routers whose operating systems accommodate IPSec properties. 
 DES was chosen as an encryption algorithm and MD5 was used as an 
authentication algorithm in these test cases. 
 IKE (Internet Key Exchange) was chosen as the key distribution mechanism 
in tests. 
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 The sniffer was used to determine throughput values for all test cases on this 
testpad. 
 The packet generator generated identical packets in over 1 minute for each 
test case. 
 The packet sniffer received packets sent by the packet generator and it 
calculated average throughputs. 
 The test results are presented in Table 4.1 and in Table 4.2. 
In the testpad, the performance of IP encapsulation was approximately 100 
percentages for all throughput values. Therefore, the performance of IP 
encapsulation was not analyzed in this section. 
Table 4.1. Test results of throughput for AH-MD5 configuration of Cisco2621 
Packet Size (byte) 
Throughput (Mbps) 
128 256 512 1024 
0.5 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 
1 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 
2 0.79 1.77 1.98 1.98 
4 0.37 1.3 2.91 3.94 
8 0.76 1.93 3.52 5.25 
In Table 4.1, test results of authentication properties of AH are shown. The input 
throughput values for this configuration are presented on first column in Table 4.1. 
The first row represents size of packets for a test case. Results of measurements are 
found by intersection of a column and a row in the table. The measurements are done 
on sniffer as Mbps for a specific packet size and for a specific input throughput 
value. 
Performance comparisons for different packet size as percentage of AH-MD5 
configuration for each test case are shown in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8. Performance analysis of AH-MD5 configuration 
The performance of AH-MD5 configuration for throughput values less than 1 Mbps 
is approximately 98 percent. For throughput values greater than 1 Mbps, the 
performance of AH-MD5 configuration decreases with the packet size being used for 
a specific test case. The overhead of small packets is greater than the overhead of 
larger packets for a specific throughput value. 
In Table 4.2, test results of authentication and encryption properties of ESP are 
shown. The input throughput values for this configuration are presented on first 
column in Table 4.2. The first row demonstrates size of packets for a test case. 
Results of measurements are found by intersection of a column and a row in the table 
as in Table 4.1. The measurements are done on sniffer as Mbps for a specific packet 
size and for a specific input throughput value. 
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Table 4.2. Test results of throughput for ESP-DES-MD5 configuration of Cisco2621 
Packet Size (byte) 
Throughput (Mbps) 
128 256 512 1024 
0.5 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.49 
1 0.76 0.99 0.98 0.99 
2 0.57 1.08 1.67 1.98 
4 0.24 0.79 1.43 2.07 
8 0.47 0.83 1.51 2.1 
Performance comparisons for different packet size as percentage of ESP-DES-MD5 
configuration for each test case are shown in Figure 4.9. 
It is seen that the performance of ESP-DES-MD5 configuration is better for packets 
with size 512 bytes and for low throughput values for the testpad. Overhead for this 
case is approximately zeros. The change of output throughput performance varies 
according to packet size. While packet size decreases, the performance for a specific 
throughput value goes down. This situation especially occurs for high rate traffic. 
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Figure 4.9. Performance analysis of ESP-DES-MD5 configuration 
For both AH-MD5 and ESP-DES-MD5 configurations, performances on low 
throughput (throughput values less than 1Mbps) values are better than that of greater 
throughput values. However, the decrease percentages of performance for both 
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configurations are not same. Actually, the difference stems from the use of power for 
processing the AH, the ESP and the cryptographic algorithms. Processing cycles 
needed for some hash algorithms are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Performance need of some hash algorithms [84] 
Algorithm MD4 MD5 RIPEMD 
RIPEMD-
128 SHA-1 
RIPEMD-
160 
Cycles 241 337 480 592 837 1013 
In addition to cryptographic algorithm that is used to establish encryption and 
authentication properties, specifications of devices are significant on performance. 
For instance, the size of memory where queues may be stored plays a crucial role. 
Another example is the type of system; it can contain parallel processing units that 
can positively affect the performance. 
A packet transmission delay overhead is affected from many factors. It is related 
with size and type of network. Moreover, devices and protocols affect the 
performance of packet transmission. To give an idea about packet delay overhead, it 
was used the result of Fasbender’s work [75] which describes a packet transmission 
delay overhead. The overhead for encapsulating and tunneling an IP packet is 
estimated by 7 ms in accordance to [85] and [86]. Also, the overheads for RSA 
encryption and decryption, is estimated by respectively 1 ms. for 1000 bit using a 
512 bit key and a hardware-based implementation. The mean transmission times in 
Mobile IP are measured by respectively 57 ms for Medium Range WAN, and 207 for 
Long Haul WAN. These results indicate that the packet transmission (packet delay) 
overhead is related with the number of hops between source and destination for an IP 
packet. In addition to number of hops, transmission delay depends on devices being 
used in the system. 
As a result, it can be said that the performance of any system, which uses IPSec 
properties and Mobile IP features, depends on the traffic characteristic and devices 
that are used in this system. Therefore, the performance of the proposed architecture 
according to throughput values and transmission delays of these instances cannot be 
generalized. However, it can be said that the overhead on nodes can be greater when 
an MN is in Internet than when an MN is in Intranet because the new architecture 
does not need any IPSec properties in Intranet. 
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4.5.3 Security analysis of the proposed architecture 
In the scenario of Section 4.4.1, the MN is in the Intranet where there is no need to 
any additional security mechanism because the Intranet is assumed to be a secure 
network. Actually, there are many security threats that come from internal intruders. 
Some of these threats are presented in [55] for Mobile IPv4. Threats related with IP 
security are valid for this scenario and also for all other scenarios discussed in this 
thesis. 
In the scenario of Section 4.4.3 where the MN is in the Internet, there is no additional 
security threat. This architecture may only cause a new security threat (scenario of 
Section 4.4.2), if the MN does not detect the network change while traversing the 
VPN Gateway sufficiently fast. In this case, unencrypted messages may be sent to 
the Internet, which may cause loss of security. Therefore, the performance of the 
network detection algorithm is crucially important for the security of the architecture. 
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5.  REQUIREMENTS TO DESIGN AN ARCHITECTURE FOR MOBILE 
IPv6 TRAVERSING IPSEC BASED VPN GATEWAY 
This chapter highlights some of the key features that should be considered to design 
an architecture that provides a Mobile IPv6 traversing IPSec based VPN Gateway. 
Most of current researches related with Mobile IPv6 are about signaling, registration 
and binding update. Because IPSec is mandatory for IPv6, there are not enough 
researches about traversing IPSec based VPN Gateways. However, this does not 
mean that there will be no need to traverse any VPN Gateway in IPv6 by mobile 
nodes. The properties of VPN Gateways are changing, and lots of these properties 
cannot be put on any node such as on an MN. Therefore, VPN Gateways will 
continue to be used until new technologies accommodating properties of a VPN 
Gateway emerge. For these reasons, there will be mechanisms to traverse VPN 
Gateways in IPv6. 
Requirements for traversing an IPSec based VPN Gateway for IPv6 are given below; 
 The solution must not cause any new security threat. 
 The solution must not need to change the IPSec protocol. 
 An MN must be able to detect network changes when it traverses an IPSec 
based VPN Gateway. 
 The signaling between an HA and an MN must be secure. The security of 
signaling is related with the location of the HA. Also, it is related with 
properties of the HA. In IPv6, HAs are planned to be on routers. Therefore, 
routers may need to be secured. 
 The MN must always access to an HA or HAs no matter where the MN 
roams. 
 If a VPN Gateway is able to support dynamic SA, an MN must support 
dynamic SA. In this situation, there is no need for two HAs, one in the 
Internet and one in the Intranet. The HA can be placed on either in the 
Internet or in the Intranet; 
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o If the HA is settled in the Intranet, the MN must establish dynamic SA 
with the VPN Gateway. 
o If the HA is set in the Internet, the MN must also establish dynamic 
SA. In this circumstance, the MN must establish dynamic SA not only 
with the VPN Gateway but also with the HA. Because MNs must 
access to the HA from the Intranet, they have to be able to accomplish 
IPSec tunnel over the VPN Gateway. 
 If the VPN Gateway does not support dynamic SA as in the proposed 
architecture for IPv4 VPN Gateways, there is no need for MN to be able to 
establish dynamic SA with the VPN Gateway. In this situation, there must be 
two HAs like the eHA and the aHA in system. 
 To guarantee the mobility and security when traversing IPSec based VPN 
Gateway for IPv6, the HA must be able to operate both as the eHA and as the 
aHA. 
 If an HA (router) is mobile such as mobile networks in a plane, it must 
contain an MN’s properties that are described above. 
 Establishing an eHA properties and an aHA properties on same device may 
be better than to set them on separate devices. 
 Routing optimization for all situations should be kept in mind. 
 A CN must operate as before. 
 The solution must be open to improvements according to changes on the IPv6 
and on the Mobile IPv6. 
 The solution may require supporting compatibility with Mobile IPv4. 
Therefore, the solution may need to be compatible with solutions proposed 
for IPv4. 
 The solution must be cost effective. 
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6.  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
During the twentieth century, the key technology has been information gathering, 
processing and distribution. Computer networks have happened one of the most 
significant revolution after first half of twenty century. They have come to play an 
increasingly important role in modern life. 
The biggest network in the world is the Internet, which is founded on IP. IP is the 
network layer protocol in DoD model. Until the last decade, lots of IP based 
computer networks had been relied on IPv4. However, needs of the Internet users 
have increased, and IPv4 has not meet requirements of them since 1990. Therefore, 
IPv6 is established to cover the requirements. In IPv6, some features of IPv4 are 
improved. Moreover, new abilities are added to the protocol. Finally, the IPv6 is 
considered to be the network layer protocol for future Internet. 
Due to the rapid technological progress, the Internet users, one of which is mobility, 
accompany new requirements. Mobility has become an important phenomenon 
especially after development of wireless technologies. In IPv4, Mobile IPv4 is used 
to accommodate the requirements. In development of IPv6, mobility has been one of 
main aspects. Mobile IPv4 was not taken into account. Therefore, it is seemed as a 
patch to IPv4 if mobility is demanded to be in systems. In contrast, mobility has been 
considered since the development of IPv6 began. 
Security, which is another new requirement of Internet users, has become the most 
significant key point in the IP based communication systems since the beginning of 
twenty first century. There are various security mechanisms to protect computer 
communication networks; however, the most popular one is IPSec. The IPSec is a 
security solution for IP. Like mobility, security was not considered when IPv4 was 
designed. Conversely, IPSec is mandatory to be implemented in IPv6. 
In this thesis, it was presented a new architecture to establish seemless mobility and 
security both in the Intranet and in the Internet by using standard communication 
protocols and new features that come with the proposed architecture. First, it was 
presented the new architecture and described its properties. Then, possible scenarios 
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for this architecture are discussed. The scenarios in the proposed architecture were 
constructed according to movement of the MN and also the CN, the CN as an MN. 
And finally, the scenarios were analyzed according to message size, overhead and 
security. To give an impression about overhead based on throughput values, a testpad 
was constructed, and some measurements were done on it. Analyses and 
measurements results show that the performance of any system, which uses IPSec 
and Mobile IP, depends on many factors such as traffic characteristic. Therefore, the 
performance of the proposed architecture cannot be generalized. However, it can be 
said that the overhead on nodes can be greater when an MN is in Internet than when 
an MN is in Intranet because the new architecture does not need any IPSec properties 
in Intranet. In addition to performance results, if the network detection mechanism 
works properly, the new architecture does not introduce any new security threat. 
Also, simulation software that was used to simulate the proposed architecture was 
introduced and explained with an example. 
The thesis highlights some of the key features that should be considered to design an 
architecture that provides Mobile IPv6 traversing IPSec based VPN Gateway. 
It needs lots of work to establish efficient mechanism for accommodating both 
security and mobility in the Internet and in the Intranet. For instance, most of IPSec 
based VPN Gateways are not compatible with either Mobile IPv4 or Mobile IPv6. 
However, to establish security and mobility in a system both IPSec and Mobile IP 
must be implemented. On the other hand, future works have to be carried on 
realizing the new architecture. A sufficiently secure network detection algorithm 
should be designed, which is assumed to exist already in this work. In addition to 
these, routing optimization may be carried out. Also, new architectures according to 
requirements can be accomplished to use with Mobile IPv6. On the other hand, new 
solutions can be done with updating Mobile IPv6 and also IPv6 to ensure security 
and mobility worldwide. 
The nation’s prosperity will be related with how much they accommodate mobility 
and security in their networks. 
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APPENDIX A. EXPLANATION OF SIMULATION SOFTWARE 
A.1 Introduction  
The simulation software based on the analytical analyses of the system is developed 
to demonstrate operations of the proposed architecture according to given scenarios. 
One of motivation of the simulation software is to show packet flows according to 
movement of MN. Another motivation is to denote what is done on an IP packet 
during its route. 
A.2 Development Platform of the Software 
 Operating System: Windows2000 Professional (Microsoft Corporation) 
 Programming environment: Borland C++ Builder 5.0 (Inspire Corporation) 
A.3 Details of the Simulation Software 
The aim of this simulation software is to show steps of the proposed architecture as 
simple as possible. Therefore, details of the software are presented using images of 
user interface of the simulation software. 
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Figure A.1. The entrance screen of the simulation software 
The entrance screen of the simulation software is shown in Figure A.1. To go to main 
part of the software, a user has to click on Go on button. After clicking the Go on 
button, the main portion of the simulation software will appear on the screen as it is 
shown in Figure A.2. 
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Figure A.2. The main portion of the simulation software 
The user interface of the simulation software consists of five parts. Generally, these 
parts are an input or an output part of the software. 
Scenarios option on menu bar is an input variable in the software. This option 
enables a user to select a simulation scenario. Scenarios option contains six different 
simulation alternatives, which are listed below; 
 Mobile Node in Intranet, 
 Mobile Node in Internet, 
 Mobile Node moves from Intranet to Internet, 
 Mobile Node moves from Internet to Intranet, 
 Correspondent Node as a Mobile Node in Intranet 
 Correspondent Node as a Mobile Node in Internet. 
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After selecting a scenario, components of the selected scenario display on the screen 
as it is shown in Figure A.3. 
 
Figure A.3. The main part of the simulation software after selecting a scenario 
The Preceding Step and the Next Step buttons in Figure A.3 can be categorized in 
input part. These buttons are used to show all steps in sequence. A user can see next 
step or preceding step of a selected scenario.  
The name of the selected scenario appears at the top of the main portion of the 
simulation software as an output part. The name part is shown in Figure A.3. 
The animation part is the second output part in the software. This part is shown with 
the biggest rectangle on the screen. Briefly, this part visualizes the components 
related with a selected scenario. In addition to this, the animation part visualizes 
packets flow and the state of the selected simulation. 
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Last part is the Information about Current Step. This part demonstrates changes 
between two steps of a selected scenario. For example network change is one of 
them. 
Details about the simulation software is given in next with an explanation example. 
A.4 A Simulation Example 
In this section, a simulation scenario example, which scenario is one of six scenarios 
mentioned in Section 4.6.2, is given to make clear the operations of the simulation 
software. 
The scenario Mobile Node Moves form Intranet to Internet is selected to demonstrate 
all steps of a simulation of the scenario. These steps are shown below. 
 Firstly, the scenario is selected. This step is shown in Figure A.4. 
 
Figure A.4. Scenario selection for the simulation example 
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 After selection the scenario, the software is ready to begin the simulation. The 
components at the beginning of the simulation appear at the animation part. This 
step is shown in Figure A.5. 
 
Figure A.5. After selection a scenario for the simulation example 
 First step of agent discovery process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.6, 
o The aHA or any FA broadcasts Agent Advertisements messages. 
o Agent Advertisements are periodically transmitted as multicasts or 
broadcasts to each link on which a node is configured to perform as a 
home agent, a foreign agent, or both. This allows a mobile node that is 
connected to such a link to determine whether any agent is present 
and, if so, their respective identities (IP addresses) and capabilities. 
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Figure A.6. First step of agent discovery in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Second step of agent discovery process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.7. 
o The MN receives an Agent Advertisement message that is sent by the 
aHA or any FA. 
o The MN detects whether it has moved from one link to another. 
o The MN obtains a care-of address when connected to a new link. 
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Figure A.7. Second step of agent discovery in Intranet for the simulation example 
 First step of registration process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.8. 
o The MN sends a Registration Request message to the aHA. 
o A Registration Request message is sent by a mobile node to begin the 
registration process. 
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Figure A.8. First step of registration in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Second step of registration process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.9. 
o The aHA checks the Registration Request message if the MN comes 
from the Internet or is a new MN that is not registered before to the 
eHA.  
o If the MN comes from the Internet, the aHA updates its binding entry 
and its mode form slave to master for this MN. 
o  If the MN is a new MN, the aHA creates a new binding entry for the 
MN. 
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Figure A.9. Second step of registration in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Third step of registration process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.10. 
o The aHA sends a Registration Replay to the MN. It is assumed that 
the registration request is accepted. 
o The aHA informs the eHA about the MN. 
o The structure of datagram between the aHA and the VPN Gateway = 
IP(P): 
 Source IP address         : IP address of aHA(1), 
 Destination IP address : IP address of eHA(1). 
o The structure of datagram between the VPN Gateway and the eHA = 
IP(AH(ESP(IP(P)))): 
 Source IP address         : IP address of VPN Gateway, 
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 Destination IP address : IP address of eHA(1). 
 
Figure A.10. Third step of registration in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Fourth step of registration process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.11. 
o The MN is ready to exchange user data. 
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Figure A.11. Fourth step of registration in Intranet for the simulation example 
 First step of routing process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.12. 
o HSI = 0. 
o The MN sends an IP packet to the CN with following properties: 
 The structure of datagram = IP(P), 
 Source IP address         : permanent IP address of MN, 
 Destination IP address : IP address of CN. 
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Figure A.12. First step of routing in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Second step of routing process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.13. 
o HSI = 0. 
o The CN sends an IP packet to the MN with the following properties: 
 The structure of datagram = IP(P), 
 Source IP address         : IP address of CN, 
 Destination IP address : permanent IP address of MN. 
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Figure A.13. Second step of routing in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Third step of routing process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.14. 
o HSI = 1. 
o The aHA encapsulates (IP in IP encapsulation) the received packet 
with the following properties: 
 The structure of datagram = IP(IP(P)), 
 Source IP address of outer datagram         : IP address of CN, 
 Destination IP address of outer datagram : care-of address of 
MN. 
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Figure A.14. Third step of routing in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Fourth step of routing process in Intranet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.15. 
o The MN receives the encapsulated packet. 
o The MN decapsulates the tunneled datagram and processes the 
original datagram 
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Figure A.15. Fourth step of routing in Intranet for the simulation example 
 Network change step 
o This step is shown in Figure A.16. 
o The MN moves from the Intranet to the Internet. 
 116 
 
Figure A. 16. Network change step for the simulation example 
 Network detection step 
o This step is shown in Figure A.17. 
o The MN detects network change, the change from the Intranet to the 
Internet. 
o Then the MN changes its mode from normal mode to secure mode. 
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Figure A.17. Network detection step for the simulation example 
 First step of agent discovery process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.18. 
o The eHA or any FA broadcasts Agent Advertisements messages. 
o Agent Advertisements are periodically transmitted as multicasts or 
broadcasts to each link on which a node is configured to perform as a 
home agent, a foreign agent, or both. This allows a mobile node that is 
connected to such a link to determine whether any agent is present 
and, if so, their respective identities (IP addresses) and capabilities. 
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Figure A.18. First step of agent discovery in Internet for the simulation example 
 Second step of agent discovery process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.19. 
o The MN receives an Agent Advertisement message that is sent by the 
eHA or any FA. 
o The MN detects whether it has moved from one link to another. 
o The MN obtains a care-of address when connected to a new link. 
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Figure A.19. Second step of agent discovery in Internet for the simulation example 
 First step of registration process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.20 
o The MN sends a Registration Request message to the eHA. 
o A Registration Request message is sent by a mobile node to update its 
state (binding entry) information on the eHA and the aHA. 
 120 
 
Figure A.20. First step of registration in Internet for the simulation example 
 Second step of registration process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.21. 
o The eHA checks the Registration Request message if the MN comes 
from the Intranet or is a new MN that is not registered before to the 
aHA.  
o If the MN comes from the Intranet, the eHA updates its binding entry 
and its mode form slave to master for this MN.  
o if the MN is a new MN, the eHA creates a new binding entry for the 
MN. 
o The eHA changes its state form slave (passive) to master (active) in 
this scenario. 
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Figure A.21. Second step of registration in Internet for the simulation example 
 Third step of registration process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.22. 
o The eHA sends a Registration Replay to the MN. It is assumed that 
the registration request is accepted. 
o The eHA informs the aHA about the MN. 
o The structure of datagram between the aHA and the VPN Gateway = 
IP(P), 
 Source IP address         : IP address of eHA(1), 
 Destination IP address : IP address of aHA(1). 
o The structure of datagram between the VPN Gateway and the eHA = 
IP(AH(ESP(IP(P)))), 
 Source IP address         : IP address of eHA(1), 
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 Destination IP address : IP address of VPN Gateway. 
 
Figure A.22. Third step of registration in Internet for the simulation example 
 Fourth step of registration process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.23. 
o The MN is ready to exchange user data. 
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Figure A.23. Fourth step of registration in Internet for the simulation example 
 First step of routing process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.24. 
o HSI = 2,1. 
o The MN sends a datagram in an IPSec tunnel to the VPN Gateway. 
o The structure of datagram = IP(AH(ESP(IP(P)))), 
 Source IP address         : care-of address of MN, 
 Destination IP address : IP address of VPN Gateway. 
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Figure A.24. First step of routing in Internet for the simulation example 
 Second step of routing process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.25. 
o HSI = 0. 
o The VPN Gateway receives the datagram and decapsulates it from the 
IPSec tunnel.  
o The VPN Gateway sends the inner datagram to the CN. 
o The CN receives the datagram. 
o The structure of datagram = IP(P), 
 Source IP address         : permanent IP address of MN, 
 Destination IP address : IP address of CN. 
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Figure A.25. Second step of routing in Internet for the simulation example 
 Third step of routing process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.26. 
o HSI = 0. 
o The CN creates and sends an IP packet to the MN with the 
following properties: 
o The structure of datagram = IP(P), 
o Source IP address         : IP address of CN, 
o Destination IP address : permanent IP address of MN. 
o The aHA receives the datagram. 
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Figure A.26. Third step of routing in Internet for the simulation example 
 Fourth step of routing process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.27. 
o HSI = 1. 
o The aHA encapsulates (IP in IP encapsulation) the received packet 
with the following properties: 
o The structure of datagram = IP(IP(P)), 
o Source IP address of outer datagram         : permanent IP 
address of MN, 
o Destination IP address of outer datagram : IP address of 
eHA. 
o The aHA sends the encapsulated packet. 
o The VPN Gateway receives the datagram. 
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Figure A.27. Fourth step of routing in Internet for the simulation example 
 Fifth step of routing process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.28. 
o HSI = 3,1. 
o The VPN Gateway encapsulates the received datagram in an 
IPSec tunnel with the following properties: 
o The structure of datagram = IP(AH(ESP(IP(IP(P))))), 
o Source IP address of outer datagram         : IP address of 
VPN Gateway, 
o Destination IP address of outer datagram : permanent IP 
address of MN, 
o The VPN Gateway sends the encapsulated datagram.  
o The eHA receives the datagram. 
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Figure A.28. Fifth step of routing in Internet for the simulation example 
 Sixth step of routing process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.29. 
o HSI = 4,1. 
o The eHA encapsulates (IP in IP encapsulation) the received packet 
with the following properties: 
 The structure of datagram = IP(IP(AH(ESP(IP(IP(P)))))), 
 Source IP address of outer datagram         : IP address of eHA, 
 Destination IP address of outer datagram : care-of address of 
MN. 
 The eHA sends the encapsulated datagram. 
 The MN receives the datagram. 
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Figure A.29. Sixth step of routing in Internet for the simulation example 
 Seventh step of routing process in Internet 
o This step is shown in Figure A.30. 
o The MN decapsulates the original datagram form the IPSec tunnel 
and from Mobile IP tunnels. 
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Figure A.30. Seventh step of routing in Internet for the simulation example 
 
 131 
BIOGRAPHY 
Şerif Bahtiyar was born in Omurtag (Bulgaria) in 1977. He received the B.Sc. degree 
in control and computer engineering from Istanbul Technical University in 2001. He 
has been working as a researcher in National Research Institute of Electronics and 
Cryptology (TÜBİTAK UEKAE) since 2001. 
His research interests include computer networks, next generation Internet, security, 
mobility, distributed operating systems, parallel programming and intelligent 
systems. 
 
 
